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HARMONIZING FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND FOREIGN
MONEY JUDGMENT RECOGNITION THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
INTRODUCTION
Picture this: A defendant argues that a dispute should be taken abroad. The
plaintiff responds and pleads that the available foreign court is riddled with
fraud and begs to keep the case in the United States. Fast forward twelve years.
The defendant having successfully taken the claim abroad now claims that the
judgment from the very same court that it advocated for is “a product of
bribery, fraud and is illegitimate” and that the “judgment is [not] enforceable in
any court that observes the rule of law.”1 The plaintiff, on the other hand,
vehemently defends the judgment of the foreign court, stating that the ruling
“marks the first time indigenous people have won a judgment against a U.S.
company in a foreign court for environmental crimes.”2 Such is the narrative of
Aguinda v. Texaco, an international legal battle between a small Amazonian
town and an American multinational corporation that has been continuing
since 1993.3
A case such as this two-decade saga—one between a multinational
corporation Chevron and a small indigenous Amazonian tribe from Ecuador
that has exploded into a legal behemoth involving multiple countries and
various courts—has exposed a serious legal Catch 22 for both defendants and
foreign plaintiffs. On the one hand, the plaintiff has suffered a significant harm
that needs to be redressed. On the other hand, the court that ultimately decided
the issue—a court that the defendant pressed to hear the case through forum
non conveniens—may not have been impartial. This case would see that
nobody has yet to receive justice: the plaintiff has not been compensated, and
the defendant has not been fairly heard.

1 Sam Ramon, Chevron Statement on Ecuador Judgment Enforcement Action, CHEVRON, (May 30,
2012), http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/05302012_chevronstatementonecuadorjudgment
enforcementaction38s0_25g.news.
2 Affected Communities Fight for Justice, CHEVRONTOXCIO, http://chevrontoxico.com/about/rainforestchernobyl/affected-communities-fight-for-justice (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
3 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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But was the forum non conveniens wrongly granted? Although taking a
case abroad is fairly easy, enforcing that judgment back in the U.S. is much
more difficult. Much of the harm, as well as vital witnesses, are located—these
are justifications for granting forum non conveniens. But what happens when
the standard and integrity of that alternate forum can be questioned? In
response to foreign lawsuits, the U.S. courts have systematically applied the
doctrine of forum non conveniens and variations of the Uniform ForeignCountry Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA) to decide whether
the case should be litigated in the U.S., and also whether a monetary judgment
from a foreign court should be enforced by an American court. However, a
conflict arises (as it has for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs of Texaco) when the
foreign court may meet the standard for a foreign non conveniens dismissal but
does not satisfy the strict criterion of the UFCMJRA.4
This Comment proposes a method that would resolve the Catch 22 of cases
such as the Ecuadorian example discussed above. This Comment argues that
instead of making drastic doctrinal or statutory changes in the application of
forum non conveniens and foreign money judgment standards to deal with
such a situation, the U.S. courts should apply forum non conveniens dismissal
on the condition that the case be moved to an international arbitration panel
that is specifically tailored to handle the dispute at hand. Part I provides an
overview of the forum non conveniens doctrine and the foreign money
judgment recognition standards, and the difficulty in reconciling the two
doctrines. Part II looks to see whether international arbitration could meet the
criteria of an adequate forum under forum non conveniens and assesses the
judicial appropriateness of using an arbitration court as an alternate forum.
Furthermore, it proposes the methods that would allow courts to introduce
arbitration as an alternate forum and tests the viability of the methods by
applying them to Aguinda v. Texaco. Part III discuses methods to satisfy
Forum Non Conveniens factors through international arbitration. Part IV
concludes by summarizing the arguments made in previous part and advocates
for a change in the current legal landscape to prevent future Texaco scenarios.

4 UNIFORM FOREIGN COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (1962) available at http://www.
uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Foreign-Country%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act
[hereinafter UFCMJRA].
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I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION IN THE
UNITED STATES
This section will discuss U.S. forum non conveniens and foreign judgment
enforcement standard, and the paradox that rises once the two doctrines are
simultaneously applied. Section A gives the jurisprudence of forum non
conveniens in the U.S. Section B describes the doctrinal development of
foreign judgment enforcement. Section C addresses the problems that arise
when the two doctrines are subsequently applied together. Section D discusses
the Aguinda v. Texaco in greater detail to show the real-life consequences that
the paradox between the two doctrines can bring. Section E examines the
solutions suggested by others in remedying this problem, and why other
approaches may be required to prevent such situations.
A. History of forum non conveniens and its Current Application
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine applied in common law that allows the
court to decline to exercise jurisdiction because the interests of justice are best
served if the trial takes place in another court.5 Though forum non conveniens
was a relatively infrequent occurrence in the past,6 the tremendous growth in
international commerce since World War II has increased the variety of cases
in which a foreign court would be a more convenient forum.7 As it is not a
codified law, the standards of forum non conveniens vary from state to state in
the U.S.8 However, the general shape of the doctrine has been made clear
through seminal cases such as Piper Aircraft v. Reyno,9 Gulf Oil v. Gilbert,10
and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty.11
An analysis of forum non conveniens is a two stage process:
First, the court must consider whether an adequate alternative forum
exists. If so, it must “then balance a series of factors involving the

5

RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE,
FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 1 (Oxford Scholarship
Online 2009)
6 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD COOPER, & RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (3d ed. 2013).
7 Id.
8 See BRAND, supra note 5, at 71–72.
9 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
10 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
11 Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
AND
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private interests of the parties in maintaining the litigation in the
competing fora and any public interests at stake.” The defendant
seeking dismissal bears the burden as to both questions.12

An adequate forum is defined as a forum where the entire case and the parties
involved in the suit will be subjected to its jurisdiction.13 Though the judicial
standard of what constitutes an adequate alternative forum can be summarized
as easily as a venue where the parties will not be “deprived of any remedy or
treated unfairly,”14 meeting this standard can be quite complicated. For
example, intrinsic elements such as the area of law that was the subject of the
case, the basis of the subject matter jurisdiction, and the presence and industry
of the plaintiff or defendant can influence whether an adequate forum is
satisfactory.15 Extrinsic factors such as political and governmental stability of
the foreign country and the country’s economic development and legal system
also weigh heavily in assessing the validity of the alternate forum.16
After demonstrating that the alternative forum has met the adequacy
standard of the court, a two-part analysis of balancing the private and public
factors takes place to analyze whether forum non conveniens should be
granted. The private and public factors of forum non conveniens are laid out in
the United States Supreme Court decision Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.17 Private
factors are used to assess the convenience, to the litigators, of adjudication in
the current federal forum in comparison to the proposed foreign forum.18
Private factors are defined using factors such as
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the
premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.19

12

Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
14 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255 (1981).
15 Michael T. Lii, An Empirical Examination of the Adequate Alternative Forum in the Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 513, 514 (2009).
16 Id.
17 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 501 (1947).
18 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 (1981).
19 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. 501, 501–02 (1947) (alteration in original).
13
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Public interest factors look closer at the difficulties imposed upon the local
population and the community for carrying the burden of jury duty for a case
that has no local connection, as well as the third parties related to the
litigation.20 Public interests include “administrative difficulties associated with
court congestion; the unfairness of imposing jury duty on a community with no
relation to the litigation; the interest in having localized controversies decided
at home; and avoiding difficult problems in conflict of laws and the application
of foreign law.”21 The factors under public and private interest analysis are
applied flexibly without giving emphasis to one element or the other,22 with
much of the determination left with the trial court.23
Though much deference is given to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, such a
rule does not apply in the case of a foreign plaintiff.24 This is because although
U.S. courts have been favorably looked upon by foreign plaintiffs for the
tactical advantage that can result from local laws that favor the plaintiff’s case
and the “habitual generosity of juries in the United States . . . and the plaintiff’s
popularity or the defendant’s unpopularity in the region,”25 the likelihood of
the U.S. forum being convenient for the plaintiff is much less than in the case
of a U.S. plaintiff.26 Forum non conveniens can be used to prevent the
plaintiff’s abuse of forum to “‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by
inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue
his remedy.”27 As such, even though both plaintiff and defendant may be
20

Id. at 502.
Id. at 508.
22 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 234 (1981).
23 Id.. By no means however, are these factors the only ways in which the courts have applied to see
whether a forum non conveniens motion should be granted. Alternate approaches in analyzing forum non
conveniens have been taken by other courts. See, Sidney K. Smith, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign
Policy, 90 TEX. L. REV. 743 (2012). For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Callasso v. Morton & Co., applied a
four factor approach in seeing whether forum non conveniens should be granted. There, the plaintiff was a
Nicaraguan citizen who had brought a wrongful death action on the behalf of a sailor under the Jones Act
against a Florida corporation that managed vessels for an Antiguan corporation where the accident that caused
the sailor took place. Callasso v. Morton & Co., 234 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2004). In Callasso, the
Eleventh Circuit looked not only at whether an adequate forum had existed and the private and public interest
factors of granting a forum non conveniens was satisfied, but also considered “if the balance favors the
alternative forum, determine whether the plaintiff can reinstate the suit in that forum without undue
inconvenience or prejudice.” 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD COOPER, &
RICHARD D. FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828 (3d ed. 2013).
24 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 (1981).
25 Haidee Iragorri v. United Techs Corp & Otis Elevator Co., 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).
26 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256 (1981).
27 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508 (1947).
21
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within the court’s jurisdiction, the courts have power sua sponte to prevent the
case from being litigated if it believes the plaintiff is harassing the defendant
by using an inconvenient forum, or that the cause of the action has no bearing
on the community that is being forced to adjudicate the case.28
Due to the looseness of the factors for forum non conveniens, as well as the
broad discretion given to trial court judges to decide whether to hear
international cases, forum non conveniens has been criticized by the legal
community for being “arbitrary and inconsistent” and for foreclosing litigation
for international plaintiffs who must now rely on a hypothetical forum.29 It is
argued that for international plaintiffs, the claims typically involve American
multinational corporation defendants and as such, creates a substantial interest
for the U.S. courts to adjust the cases.30
Dismissal of a case under forum non conveniens is usually conditioned on
the defendant’s submission to an alternate forum.31 For example, in Aguinda v.
Texaco, the district court’s grant of forum non conveniens was remanded by
the Second Circuit for failing to order that it be conditioned upon Texaco
submitting itself to Ecuadorean jurisdiction, and that Texaco waive its defense
of statute of limitation.32 Similarly in Ochoa v. Empresas ICA, the dismissal
was conditional upon the grounds that the defendant must submit itself to
Mexican jurisdiction, and that should the plaintiff find it impossible to reinstate
the action in a Mexican court, the defendant acquiesce to the case being
reopened for litigation in the United States.33 Likewise, the court in Akofin v.
Jumbo Navigatio, N.V. also stipulated a condition to the grant of forum non
conveniens. Akofin involved two foreign seamen who died in an on-board

28

Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508 (1947).
Elizabeth T. Lear, Note, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the
Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2006); see Allen R. Stein, Forum Non
Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 785 (1985) (stating that
the inconsistency of forum non conveniens judgments have led to a “crazy quilt of ad hoc, capricious, and
inconsistent decisions.”). But see, John Wilson, Note, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and
the Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 659, 661 (2004) (discussing
that a wider forum non conveniens standard will place the “burden of litigation on the proper court abroad and
curtail forum shopping”).
30 Wilson, supra note 29, at 661.
31 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 (1981) (conditioning the defendant’s dismissal with
defendant’s agreement to waive any statute of limitation challenge as well as submitting to the jurisdiction of
Scotland).
32 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 474, 475.
33 Guadalupe Gallego v. Empresas ICA, No. 11-23898-CIV, 2013 WL 5674697 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
29
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accident of a foreign vessel. Taking the consents of jurisdiction as established
by previous cases even further, the court required that the defendants submit to
jurisdiction in Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, and Russia.34 The court also
stipulated that should the defendants not abide by the jurisdictions of the
foreign courts, the plaintiff had the right to reopen the case in the United
States.
B. The Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition
As a foreign litigant, one of the biggest hurdles after being dismissed to an
alternate forum is not the actual litigation, but bringing a foreign judgment
back to the U.S. for enforcement. Like forum non conveniens, recognition of
foreign monetary judgment differs state by state as no unifying federal statute
exists.35 However three sources exists as to help construct the discussion of
foreign money judgment recognition: Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act of 1962 (UFMJRA); Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act of 2005 (FCMJRA); and the common law doctrine of comity.
Together, the three sources give a glimpse in to what the U.S. courts may look
to determine whether a foreign judgment should be upheld.
UFMJRA was written by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to codify the standard of recognizing judgments from
foreign countries.36 The UFMJRA has been adopted by thirty-two states,
including New York.37 The act applies only when the “foreign judgment . . . is
final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal
34

Akofin v. Jumbo Navigation, 481 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
See JOHN B. BELLINGER, III & R. REEVES ANDERSON, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM,
TAMING TORT TOURISM: THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL SOLUTION TO FOREIGN JUDGMENT RECOGNITION 2 (2013).
36 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1964), available at http://www.uniformlaws.
org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20judgments%20recognition/ufmjra%20final%20act.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2014) [hereinafter UFMJRA]. UFMJRA limits its enforceability through defining foreign judgment as
“any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for
taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters.” Id. at § 1(2).
However it does allow the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not covered by the act. Id. at § 5(b).
37 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5303 (McKinney 2014). The states to have adopted the UFMJRA are: Alaska,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, U.S.
Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION: THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20Recognition%20Act (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
35
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therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.”38 Though UFMJRA makes it
explicit that courts applying the act are free to give a foreign judgment a
greater effect than required by the act, “judgments rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law must neither be recognized nor enforced.”39
Section 4 of UFMJRA sets out the grounds of non-recognition of foreign
judgments in two parts: (1) inclusiveness of the judgment and (2) grounds on
which a judgment does not need to be recognized.40 A judgment is not
considered “conclusive” if “the judgment was rendered under a system which
does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law.”41 A judgment need not be recognized
under UFMJRA if the judgment was obtained by fraud; or the judgment
conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment.42
The UFMJRA was updated in 2005 as the Uniform Foreign-Country
Money Judgments Recognition Act (UFCMJRA).43 The UFCMJRA was
established to address some of the issues that arose over applying the
UFMJRA rule.44 For example, UFCMJRA clarified that the full faith and credit
clause of the U.S. constitution does not influence whether to enforce foreign
judgments; this point was ambiguous in UFMJRA. The act also requires that
the party that is raising the non-recognition carry the burden of proof to
establish the grounds for non-enforcement. This was in response to cases such
as Bridge Way Corp. v. Citibank.45 In Bridge Way, the plaintiff attempted to
enforce a judgment given by the Supreme Court of Liberia against the
defendant. The district court placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show
that the mandatory basis for non-recognition did not exist to show that the
judgment was enforceable.46 The 2005 act also imposes a statute of limitation
38 UFMJRA § 2 (1964), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20money%20
judgments%20recognition/ufmjra%20final%20act.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
39 Id. at 1.
40 Id. at § 4.
41 Id. at § 4(a)(1).
42 Id.
43 UFCMJRA (2005), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20
money%20judgments%20recognition/ufcmjra_final_05.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
44 For example, plaintiffs were using registration and enforcement procedures reserved for domestic
judgments for foreign judgments. To address this issue, the new Act requires that recognition of a foreign
judgment be filed as an original action or a counterclaim. See id. at § 4(b).
45 Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 45 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
46 Id.
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on enforcement of a foreign judgment.47 The UFCMJRA has been adopted by
thirteen states so far.48
The third standard is the common law theory of comity. Comity is defined
as recognition given by one nation to another nation’s laws and its judicial
decision out of respect and courtesy.49 Though comity specifically
acknowledges that it is a “voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered,”50
a procedurally regular and non-fraudulently obtained foreign judgment has
been held to be entitled to comity.51
When looked at together, the three sources, UFMJRA, UFCMJRA, and
theory of comity present a challenging standard for a foreign plaintiff looking
to enforce its judgment in the United States. Under the two model laws, the
plaintiff bears the burden to enforce the judgment and to display a hefty
showing that the judgment was not rendered in an impartial tribunal or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process. Additionally,
comity between the foreign court and the U.S. court may cause a divide
between the two even if the judgment could satisfy the UFMJRA/UFCMJRA
standards. Thus, much of these determinative factors are out of the plaintiff’s
control, and the fate of enforcing these judgments is primarily in the grander
international political landscape of the foreign nation and the courts of the
United States.
C. Forum non Conveniens/Foreign Judgment Recognition Standard Paradox
Though both forum non conveniens and the standards applied in
recognizing foreign monetary judgments vary depending on the state applying
the rule, both doctrines require the analysis of the appropriateness of the
alternative forum. More specifically, under forum non conveniens, it is
required that an adequate alternative forum exist. In both UFMJRA and
47

UFCMJRA § 6 (2005).
See UNIF. LAW COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE FACT SHEET—FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Foreign%20Money%20Judgments%20
Recognition%20Act (last visited Feb. 20, 2014) (listing states).
49 “The recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nations, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other persons who are under the protections of its laws.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163–64 (1895).
50 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 (1839).
51 Violea I. Balan, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States: The Need
for Federal Legislation, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 229, 235 (2003).
48
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UFCMJRA, foreign “judgments rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law [would] neither be recognized nor enforced.”52
As similar as these two standards sound, when in application, the scrutiny
applied to each standard is quite different. At the forum non conveniens stage,
the issue centers on the adequacy of the forum from the perspective of the
plaintiff.53 Enforcement of judgment, by contrast, looks at whether the foreign
forum has “violated important right[s] of the defendant.”54 This difference in
perspective creates a rather difficult position for plaintiffs whose forum may be
sufficient for a dismissal, but is unsatisfactory enough for judgment
enforcement.
In forum non conveniens, a foreign court will only be “inadequate . . .
where the remedy provided is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory, that it is
no remedy at all.”55 Because there has not been explicit guidance by the
Supreme Court in determining proper standard analysis or factors should be
looked into in determining adequacy of the foreign court, the approaches by
the lower federal courts have been inconsistent and can only be described as
“no-scrutiny” or “minimal-scrutiny.”56 Even under the strictest scrutiny
articulated, the foreign court will fail the adequacy only if the “conditions in
the foreign forum . . . plainly demonstrate that the plaintiffs are highly unlikely
to obtain basic justice therein.”57
The ex-ante approach of forum non conveniens when looking at an
alternate forum is vastly different from the perspective of the court during the
foreign judgment enforcement stage. During the enforcement stage, the
litigation in foreign court has already taken place and no guess-work is needed
in figuring out whether the alternative forum was adequate enough to oversee
the case. Described as a defendant-centered approach, enforcement of foreign
52

UFCMJRA § 4(b)(1) (2005); UFMJRA § 4(a)(1) (1964).
See Douglass Cassel, Forum Non Conveniens, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, and the Chevron
Litigation, LETTER BLOGATORY (May 30, 2012), http://lettersblogatory.com/2012/05/30/cassel-forum-nonconveniens-chevron/. See generally Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235.
54 Cassel, supra note 53. See, e.g., Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that U.S. courts may not recognize foreign judgment deriving from courts that fail to provide
impartial tribunal or due process of law).
55 Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006).
56 Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments, 111 COL. L. REV. 1444, 1458 (2011).
57 Van Borralho v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 393–94 (5th Cir. 1983).
53
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money judgment looks to whether the alternate forum was fair and impartial
for the defendants, and does not consider the plaintiffs’ point of view.58 As
discussed above, under foreign judgment enforcement standards, courts may
refuse to uphold foreign judgments if the judgment rendered by a court that
was not impartial, if the procedures of the said tribunal were not compatible
with the requirements of due processes of law, or if there was a lack of
comity.59
From this observation of forum non conveniens and the application of the
foreign judgment enforcement standard, it is clear that the latter is much more
strict, and continues to become more strict, and it benefits from the ex post
perspectives that could not be enjoyed by the court exercising the forum non
conveniens order. Thus, when the two doctrines are simultaneously applied, as
might occur in the Texaco litigation, the doctrinal clash could cause a serious
access-to-justice issue. The problem arises from the fact that the forum non
conveniens standard does not scrutinize the degree of due process and
impartiality of the foreign forum to the degree that it is scrutinized during the
enforcement stage. Also, as in any ex-ante analysis, the forum non conveniens
analysis only looks to what may be reasonably foreseeable at the time. As
such, though an alternate forum may have been deemed appropriate at the time
of granting the forum non dismissal, by the time the suit has commenced, that
forum may no longer be able to provide even a basic level of justice due to
reasons such as political turmoil or judicial corruption.
These apparent gaps between the two standards have already been
recognized by various corporate defendants in cases similar to the Chevron
litigation. In Delgado v. Shell Oil Co, citizens of 12 foreign countries sought
damages for injuries that arose from pesticide usage on farms owned by an
American multinational corporation. There, the defendants succeeded in
moving the case to Nicaragua, arguing that the alternative forums were more
appropriate to adjudicate the case.60 However the defendants also filed a
motion to incorporate the protections of the UFMJRA and equivalent common
law rules.61 When the plaintiff won a monetary verdict and attempted to collect
the judgment in the United States, the defendant counterclaimed that the
Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable because the foreign court failed to
58
59
60
61

See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
Supra Part I(b).
Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 175 n. 21.
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remain impartial and systematically denied due process.62 The defendants
highlighted the two different standards between forum non conveniens and
foreign judgment recognition.63 Stating that the “adequate alternative forum
inquiry in forum non conveniens cases is governed by a different, less
demanding standard that is used to determine whether a foreign judgment is
enforceable in the United States,”64 the defendants moved to challenge the
enforcement of the foreign judgment on the grounds of lack of due process and
failure to provide impartial tribunals. Noting the deteriorated condition of the
Nicaraguan judicial system, the defendant argued that “whatever anyone might
have said about the state of the Nicaraguan legal system as it existed in 1995
cannot, by definition, be ‘truly inconsistent’ with its assertions about the state
of the Nicaraguan legal system at a different time—that is, in 2002 and
today.”65
Such cases illustrate not only the doctrinal gap between forum non
conveniens and foreign judgment enforcement standards, but also the parties’
and the court’s recognition of such gap. As one plaintiff woefully pointed out,
such gaps would make the American defendants judgment proof while leaving
the plaintiffs with no forum or remedy to address their wrong.66
D. Visiting the Amazon: Case of Aguinda v. Texaco
The Texaco lawsuit, later known as the Chevron lawsuit,67 finds its genesis
in Texaco Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of Texaco, and its endeavors in
Ecuador. In 1964, Texaco engaged in oil exploration and drilling activities in
the lowland areas of the Amazon basin named Oriente, an eastern region of

62

Id.
Id.
64 Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Shell Oil Co. v.
Franc, No. CV03-8846 nm, 2005 WL 6187867 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
65 Id. Similarly in Osorio v. Dole Food Co. the court explicitly commented on a blocking statute enacted
by the Nicaraguan government (Special Law 364) that was enacted after the American forum non conveniens
dismissal which the defendant claimed was a failure of Nicaraguan courts to afford the defendants a fair and
impartial justice. 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
66 See Trial Brief Submitted by Plaintiff, Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian v. Robinson Helicopter, No.
206CV01798, 2009 WL 2213204, at 10 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
67 Chevron purchased the Texas tycoon Texaco in 2001. See George Raine, THE CHEVRON-TEXACO
MERGER, SFGATE (Oct. 10, 2001, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/THE-CHEVRONTEXACO-MERGER-An-oil-giant-2870161.php.
63
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Ecuador.68 However, with big profits came big problems. Described as a “rainforest Chernobyl,”69 the plaintiffs of Aguinda v. Texaco alleged that during its
operation, Texaco had managed to spill more than 16 million gallons of oil due
to its negligent operation.70 This catastrophic spill was nearly double the
amount of oil that was spilled during the Exxon Valdez oil disaster.71
The indigenous residents living in the Lago Agrio oil field area, along with
residents of Peru who live south of the field, brought suit against Texaco in the
Southern District of New York in 1993.72 However the case was dismissed
under forum non conveniens when Texaco agreed to voluntarily submit itself
to the Ecuadorian jurisdiction and waive its statute of limitations defense. The
court of appeals upheld the district court’s dismissal under forum non
conveniens; on the grounds that there were Ecuadorian lawsuits pending at the
time against multinational corporations without any evidence of corruption and
that numerous American courts have found Ecuador to be an adequate forum
to resolve civil disputes involving U.S. companies.73
68 Complaint at para. 42, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1993 WL 13148394 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
From 1972 until 1993, the Lago Agrio field produced 1.7 billion barrels of oil, bringing Texaco a profit of $25
billion. David Feige, Pursuing the Polluters, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/
2008/apr/20/opinion/op-feige20. Texaco continued its operation at Oriente until July 1990. Patrick Radden
Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/
09/120109fa_fact_keefe?currentPage=all.
69 Keefe, supra note 68.
70 The complaint read,

[t]he Ecuadorian government estimates that 16.8 million gallons of oil have spilled from the
pipeline. That, alone, is approximately six million gallons more than was spilled in the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. The pipeline was negligently designed and constructed by the defendant with an
inadequate number of shut-off valves, so that when a rupture occurs, oil will flow unchecked for
days.
Complaint at para. 40, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1993 WL 13148394 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
71 Id. at para. 7. After visiting the Lago Agrio site in 2007, the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa
compared the oil spill to being the equivalent of a “crime against humanity.” Keefe, supra note 68.
72 Complaint at 1, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 7527, 1993 WL 13148394 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). They
argued that Texaco’s pipeline had contaminated waters used by the local population for fishing, bathing and
drinking, the plaintiff charged Texaco with negligence, public and private nuisance, and trespass under the
Alien Tort Victims Act. Complaint at para. 7, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1993 WL 13148394
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
73 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 470. The court held that
1) no evidence of impropriety by Texaco or any past member of the Consortium in any prior
judicial proceeding in Ecuador; 2) there are presently pending in Ecuador’s courts numerous
cases against multinational corporations without any evidence of corruption; 3) Ecuador has
recently taken significant steps to further the independence of its judiciary; 4) the State
Department’s general description of Ecuador’s judiciary as politicized applies primarily to cases
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In Ecuador, however, Texaco (now Chevron due to a merger in 2001)74 was
met with a great surprise. During the Ecuadorian lawsuit,75 an independent
court-appointed expert, Richard Cabrera, estimated that the potential cost of
environment damages for which Chevron is accountable was in the upwards of
$27 billion, an amount that is half of Ecuadorian GDP.76 After much mishap
and controversy, including Texaco accusing the plaintiff of arranging a behindthe-scenes meeting with the judge and overinflating the environmental
damages,77 the Ecuadorean court ruled for the plaintiffs with a stunning $18.2
billion judgment against Chevron in 2011.78
After the groundbreaking judgment from Ecuador, the rainforest lawsuit
spilled across the world as the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgment.79 By
March of 2011, Chevron filed a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) suit against the plaintiffs and their lawyers to
prevent the collection of the astronomical judgment, stating that the defendants
“set about fraudulently exploiting images of environmental degradation in rural
Ecuador to extort money from a U.S. company in a criminal scheme.”80
of confrontations between the police and political protestors; 5) numerous U.S. courts have found
Ecuador adequate for the resolution of civil disputes involving U.S. companies; and 6) because
these cases will be the subject of close public and political scrutiny, as confirmed by the
Republic’s involvement in the litigation, there is little chance of undue influence being applied.
We cannot say that these findings were an abuse of discretion.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
74 Chevron and Texaco Agree to $100 Billion Merger Creating Top-Tier Integrated Energy Company,
CHEVRON (Oct. 16, 2000), http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=66900&p=irol-pressreleaseArticle&
ID=123352&highlight=.
75 Aguinda v. Chevron Texaco Corp., Provincial Ct. Sucumbios, No. 002-2003 (2011) (Ecuador).
76 Compare STALIN CABRERA VEGA, TECHNICAL SUMMARY REPORT 5 available at http://chevrontoxico.
com/assets/docs/cabrera-english-2008.pdf with CHEVRON’S REBUTTAL TO THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT
REPORT,
CHEVRON,
http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/docs/cabrerarebuttalexecutivesummary.pdf
[hereinafter CHEVRON EXPERT REPORT].
77 See generally CHEVRON EXPERT REPORT; Declaration of Gerald R. McMenamin, Chevron v.
Donziger, No. 1:11CV00691, 2013 WL 2448882 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
78 Aguinda v. Chevron Texaco Corp., Provincial Ct. Sucumbios, No. 002-2003 (2011) (Ecuador). See
Chevron fails to block $18 billion Ecuador judgment¸ REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/10/09/us-usa-court-ecuador-idUSBRE8980UQ20121009; see generally Amazon Defense Coalition, Key
Documents & Court Filings from Aguinda Legal Team, CHEVRON TOXICO, available at http://chevrontoxico.
com/news-and-multimedia/2011/0406-key-documents-and-court-filings-from-aguinda-legal-team (last visited
Feb. 21, 2014).
79 Chevron does not have any assets in Ecuador. Judges re-open Chevron-Ecuador enforcement action in
Canada, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/chevron-ecuadorcanada-idUSL2N0JW1TG20131217.
80 Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691, 2011 WL 1805313 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). Judge Kaplan granted preliminary injunction against the collection of the Ecuadorean judgment not
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Following these judgments the Ecuadorean plaintiffs sought to enforce the
judgment in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina in 2012, where Chevron holds
assets. However none of these cases have led to enforcement of Ecuadorian
judgment.81 In response to these international attempts to enforce the $18
billion judgment, Chevron has opened up its own litigation by pursuing suits in
the realm of international arbitration.82
The multi-decade-long lawsuit has taken its toll on both sides. The
plaintiffs have “acknowledged concerns about their finances in recent
pleadings in the fraud case filed by Chevron in New York.”83 One firm that has
represented the Ecuadorian plaintiffs said it is owed more than $1 million in
fees and costs.84 Similarly, though Chevron obtained $26 billion in profit in
2012,85 it has so far spent $1 billion86 in litigation cost over the life of the

only in the U.S., but the entire world as well. This ruling however, was vacated on appeal as the Court of
Appeals dismissed Chevron’s motion to permanently enjoin the Ecuadorians from attempting to collect its
Ecuadorian judgment.
81 The Supreme Court of Argentina unfroze the assets and future incomes of Chevron’s Argentinean
subsidiary on the grounds that the Argentinean subsidiaries are separate legal entities that had not participated
in the original court process. Taos Turner, Argentina’s Top Court Unfreezes Chevron Assets, WALL ST. J.
(June 5, 2013 12:31 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732406330457852627214140
8966. In Brazil, the Superior Tribunal of Justice refused to review the case until it was found that the
Ecuadorean judgment meets the requirements of Brazilian law for enforcing a foreign judgment. Ecuador
plaintiffs target Chevron’s assets in Brazil, REUTERS (June 28, 2012 6:48 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/
2012/06/28/ecuador-chevron-idINL2E8HRJX920120628. Canadian courts originally rejected the Ecuadorean
plaintiff’s attempt to collect its judgment on the grounds that Chevron’s subsidiaries are legally separate from
the company and are thus not subjected to the Ecuadorean verdict. Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp. (2013) O.J. No.
1955 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). However on appeal, the Canadian court of appeals allowed the case to be heard.
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp. [2014] 118 O.R. 3d 1 (Can.).
82 “Under the terms of its contracts with the [Government of Ecuador], including its remediation
agreement [the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and Ecuador], that GOE must indemnify
Chevron and pay all legal expenses and any adverse judgment against Chevron.” Ecuador Quito Cable,
WIKILEAKS, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06QUITO705_a.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2014)
(alteration in original). However, the U.S. court dismissed the claim. Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 426 F. Supp.
2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
83 In its attempt to avoid possible future enforcement, Chevron had filed for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association in 2007 against the government of Ecuador, under the Bilateral Investment
Treaty. Julian G. Ku et al, Julian Ku and George Conway: When Corporate Defendants Go on Offense, WALL
ST. J. (July 4, 2013, 7:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873243282045785725924
76276824. Chevron also brought suit in 2009 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague under the
United States/Ecuador bilateral investment treaty. Id.
84 Daniel Gilbert, Chevron’s $19 Billion Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 21, 2013, 9:30 PM), http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323809304578432822949050916.
85 FORTUNE 500 Our annual ranking of America’s largest corporations, CNN, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/fortune500/2012/performers/companies/profits/.
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litigation, while it has spent $40 million87 in the clean-up cost accrued since
1994. Chevron’s reputation was also hurt by the litigation, as Chevron has
been accused of using its “limitless resources to intimidate and harass anyone
that dares to help.”88 As of this date, this saga of litigation still has not seen its
end.89
E. Attempts to Neutralize forum non conveniens and Foreign Judgment
Standard
Suggestions have been made by academics to address this access-to-justice
gap issue. For example, it has been proposed that implementing a federally
uniform forum non conveniens standard that mirrors the Hague Conference of
Private International Law’s draft proposal of Convention on Jurisdiction and
Judgments, which had originally included a forum non conveniens clause,
would lessen the blow of Piper Aircraft, which took away the deference of
foreign plaintiffs’ choice of court.90 Some argued to limit the influence of
Piper Aircraft by stating that because it is an interpretation of federal forum
non conveniens standard, its application among state courts can be limited.91
In response to this problem, prominent legal scholar Christopher A.
Whytock and Cassandra Burke Robertson sought a solution in their paper,
Forum Non Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments.92 In the
paper, the authors proposed to neutralize the two standards by: (1) increasing
the judicial adequacy standard of forum non conveniens to match the scrutiny
level of the judgment enforcement stage;93 (2) applying the doctrine of
equitable estoppel in the judgment enforcement stage (so that the defendants

86 Patrice Hill, Chevron Case Finds Trial Lawyer in Court After Remarks Caught on Video (Sept. 15,
2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/15/chevron-case-to-put-trial-lawyer-on-trial-after-re/
?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS#ixzz2f2rbskIj.
87 CHEVRON, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: TEXACO PETROLEUM, ECUADOR AND THE LAWSUIT AGAINST
CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/texacopetroleumecuadorlawsuit.pdf (last visited Feb. 21,
2014) [hereinafter Executive Summary].
88 Ku, supra note 83.
89 On November 12, 2013, the Ecuador Supreme Court upheld the August 2012 ruling against
Texaco/Chevron for environmental damage but halved damages to $9.51 billion. Corte Nacional De Justica
[National Court of Justice], 12 de noviembre de 2013, “Aguinda v. Chevron,” No. 174-2012 (Ecuador).
90 Wilson, supra note 29, at 659.
91 Donna Solen, Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 343, 346–47
(1994).
92 Whytock, supra note 56, at 1444.
93 Id. at 1470.
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are estopped from arguing that the same foreign court that was adequate for the
dismissal is inadequate in terms of enforcement);94 (3) barring case-specific
defenses against enforcement if the defendant has argued in forum non
conveniens stage that the alternate court was systematically adequate;95 and (4)
mandating that a forum non conveniens dismissal must accompany conditional
consent to waive all defenses against the potential foreign judgment unless the
judgment did not meet due process on account of unforeseeable changes in the
foreign court.96
The above solutions are creative and well-articulated. However the
proposed solution still retains the inherent difficulty of having to make an ex
ante judgment regarding a forum. Likewise, under Whytock and Burkes’
suggestion, the court is still in a position to make public statements regarding a
foreign jurisdiction, which may offend and upset U.S. diplomatic relationships.
Also, the question of comity and foreign judgment enforcement was also
unaddressed. For example, a U.S. court may disregard a foreign judgment from
a forum non conveniens alternate forum because that alternate forum has
refused to honor an American judgment in its past. Similarly, Douglas Cassel,
a professor of law at University of Notre Dame, has noted that Whytock’s
proposal does not discuss fraudulently begotten judgment standard of
UFMJRA and UFCMJRA.97 Under Whytock and Burke’s method, the estoppel
doctrine would force the courts to enforce a judgment even if it was
fraudulently begotten.98
However, within the limited scope of utilizing the existing forum non
conveniens and foreign award enforcement standard, no viable solution exists
to relieve the court from the burden of having to predict the future, or from
carefully walking around international sensitivity. For example, in the Aguinda
v. Texaco case, the Ecuadorian justice system initially seemed stable, if not
perfect.99 After the case was transferred, however, Ecuadorian President Rafael
94

Id. at n.281.
Id. at 1502.
96 Id. at 1508.
97 Cassel, supra note 53.
98 Id.
99 As noted by the court of appeals in Aguinda v. Texaco, the district court judge was careful in his
observation as to the stability and the ability of the Ecuadorean court to adjudicate a fair holding. See Aguinda
v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In his analysis of whether an adequate alternate forum
existed, Judge Rakoff utilized Country Reports created by the State Department and made specific notes to
Ecuador’s troubled legal history, showing a careful application of his discretion in granting the dismissal. Id.
95
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Correa began to refer to the plaintiffs’ counsel as “compañeros” (an expression
of closeness) and offered government support for the plaintiffs’ cause. The
defendants claimed that President Correa was exerting improper political
influence on the trial. Worse, beginning in 2004 the Ecuadorian legislature
moved three times in as many years to congressionally remove all nine of the
Ecuadorian constitutional judges. The legitimacy of the Ecuadorian justice
system thus looked very different in 2001, when the litigation was transferred,
than in 2011, when the case was resolved.100
This type of turmoil could not have been predicted by the ex-ante analysis
by a district court judge. Moreover, to then analyze whether it should have
been foreseeable that a foreign president would get involved the lawsuit and
the degree to which that president can exercise his influence to the ultimate
outcome of the suit, as well as whether a collapse of a country’s high courts
should be considered as a systematic change that breaches due process of law
are questions that are of a highly sensitive political nature that reach beyond
the scope of the courts as well.

While the State Department nonetheless continues to describe Ecuador’s legal and judicial
systems as “politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt” so far as certain “human rights”
practices are concerned, this is based, as the Country Reports make clear, on cases largely
involving confrontations between the police and political protestors. By contrast, not one of the
cases described by the 1999 and 2000 Country Reports as evidence of such conclusions remotely
resembles the kind of controversy here at issue.
Id. (citations omitted). Thus, even though the adequate forum analysis of forum non conveniens has been
criticized for its low standard of scrutiny, it can be seen here that, at least in the case of Aguinda v. Texaco, that
the district court had made a good faith effort in determining whether the Ecuadorian court was politically
stable enough to adjudicate the matter to the best of its ability relying on sources such as the U.S. Department
of States’ Human Rights Country Reports. Id.
100 First, President Rafael Correa, who was elected in 2006, has been accused by Chevron for asserting
improper political pressure. Since taking office, Correa has declared much of Ecuador’s national debt
illegitimate and showed hostility towards the U.S. government by restricting the usage of Eloy Alfaro Air Base
in Manta. Nicole M. Ferrand, China to Displace the U.S. at Ecuador’s Manta Base, 4 AM. REPORT 14, at 1–6
(2008), http://www.il-rs.org.br/ingles/arquivos/The_AmericasApril10.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). During
the trial, the president was known to make statements referring to the plaintiffs’ counsel as “compañeros,” and
offer governmental support for the plaintiff’s cause. See Executive Summary, supra note 88, at 7–8. Second, in
2007 the Ecuadorian legislature had moved to congressionally remove all nine of the Ecuadorian constitutional
judges. Ecuador: Removal of Judges Undermines Judicial Independence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 11,
2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/05/10/ecuador-removal-judges-undermines-judicial-independence (last
visited Feb. 22, 2014). Described as the “latest in a series of arbitrary actions by competing political factions
that have undermined the autonomy of the country’s democratic institutions,” id., such judicial upheaval of the
judicial court was the third time in three years that the Ecuadorian government sought to remove the
Constitutional Court. Id.
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II. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
To find a solution to the absurd result of law that occurs when forum non
conveniens and foreign judgment enforcement doctrine are simultaneously
applied, it is crucial to find an alternate forum that is valid enough power to
have its judgment enforced. An international arbitral panel is such a forum.
Part II introduces international arbitration in today’s context. Section A gives
brief history of international arbitration and section B will breakdown in detail
the mechanical aspects of modern international arbitration, such as: observing
the respective definition given to the words “international” and “commercial”
by the international community, what goes into creating a valid arbitration
agreement and exploring how an arbitration court is put together. Lastly it will
look at enforcement of arbitration award. Knowledge of the particulars of the
arbitration system is necessary to understand why arbitration is suitable as an
alternate forum under forum non conveniens analysis, which will be discussed
in Section C. Section C looks to policy arguments for and against arbitration.
Section D will discuss the applicability of international arbitration as an
adequate forum under the factors of forum non conveniens.
A. A Short History of International Arbitration
The simplest definition of arbitration is that it is a private system of
adjudication “born out of parties’ will.”101 Described as the “oldest method for
the peaceful settlement of international disputes,”102 arbitration was used
throughout the Hellenic world for five hundred years103 to resolve disputes
arising under treaties entered into between Greek states.104

101 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Dispute Settlement, 5.5 Law Governing the
Merits of the Dispute, UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.40 (2005).
102 A.ALEXANDER MARIE STUYT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 1794–1989 vii (3d ed.,
1990).
103 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2010), available at http://
www.aspenpublishers.com/%5CAspenUI%5CSampleChaptersPDF%5C625.pdf.
104 Arbitral procedures, known as lex merchatoria, were also utilized by trade and merchant guilds during
the Middle Ages to settle disputes outside the realm of national courts. Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex
Mercatoria and International Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?,14 AM. U.
INT’L. L. REV. 657, 658 (1999). These arbitral procedures were plagued with several difficulties, though, and
only when international law recognized pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate and enforce foreign arbitration
awards did the concept of international commercial arbitration emerge. United Nations Conference on Trade
and
Development,
Dispute
Settlement,
5.1
International
Commercial
Arbitration,
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.38, at 20–21 (2005) available at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc
232add38_en.pdf [hereinafter UNCTAD 5.1].
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The rise of modern day international arbitration finds its marker in Europe
with the International Chamber of Commerce adopting the first rule of
arbitration and establishment of Court of Arbitration in 1923.105 Following the
historical 1923 convention, the international community and national courts
have adopted several conventions and treaties as well as national laws to
regulate the influence of private adjudication. . . . 106 Such notable international
conventions and treaties include the Geneva Convention for the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927,107 the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”),108 and
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration rules of 1976109 and the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985.110

105 Id; NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1st ed., 2009).
Established by the world business community, the ICC has remained the voice of international business
community. ANDREA MARCO STEINGRUBER, CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 19 (Loukas Mistelis
ed., 2012). However, many countries did not allow for a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate and lacked a set
boundaries between the national court’s jurisdiction and the arbitral court. UNCTAD 5.1, supra note 104 at ii
Substantial difficulty existed for international arbitration until the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses adopted by the League of Nations. Id. at 20.
106 See e.g. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1947).
107 Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, League of Nations Doc., Sept. 26, 1927, 92
U.N.T.S. 301; see also UNCTAD 5.1, supra note 104 at 21 (describing the role of 1927 agreement in general
developmental landscape of arbitration).
108 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The New York Convention
made it easier to enforce a judgment by removing the “double exequateur” issue and merged the 1923 and
1927 arbitral convention. See UNCTAD 5.1, supra note 104, at 22. This is potentially one of the most
significant developments of modern international arbitration. Originally drafted by the ICC, id., the convention
now has 149 signatories. See New York Convention Countries, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION, http://www.
newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states; see also Status Map, ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/status-map. [hereinafter Status Map].
109 Arbitration Rule of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 31/98,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec 15, 1976) revised by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, G.A. Res.
68/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/109 (Dec 16, 2013), [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules].
110 UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Comm. Arb., United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, G.A. Res 40/72 U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/72 (Dec. 11, 1985) amended by G.A. Res 61/33 U.N Doc.
A/RES/61/33 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. For greater discussion, see MARGARET L.
MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 6–7 (Moses 2nd Ed.,
2012). There are 67 adaptation of the model law. Notable countries include China, Australia, Canada, and parts
of the United States. Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with
amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). So far, California (1988),
Connecticut (1989), Florida (2010), Georgia (2012), Illinois (1998), Louisiana (2006), Oregon (1991) and
Texas (1989) have adopted and enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law. Id.
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Though international commercial arbitration still lacks a solidified
definition111 and its development is not complete,112 through the joint effort of
multiple nations as well as the natural evolutions of global economy,113
arbitration has become a popular alternative to national courts for international
matters.
B. The Current Model of International Arbitration
By laying out the mechanical aspect of today’s international commercial
arbitration, this section seeks to establish the foundation for its applicability in
the context of forum non conveniens by demonstrating the legitimacy of
international arbitration and the degree of flexibility the process endows to the
participants. To illustrate this analysis, this section begins by defining
international commercial arbitration. It then explores what factors are required
to create a valid arbitration agreement. Following, the section looks at how an
arbitration panel is formed and the various selections that the parties could
make to create a court that suits their needs. Lastly, the section observes how
an international arbitration awards are enforced in the context of international
conventions.114
1. Defining “International” and “Commercial”
Modern international arbitration has been said to exist in a “different
domain, a non-national or international sphere.”115 Perhaps the best way of
starting to understand the current model of international commercial arbitration
and its flexibility begins with how widely the term “international” and
“commercial” are interpreted by various entities.
There is no universal definition of what makes an arbitration
“international” or “foreign.”116 Under the Model Law definition, an arbitration
is of an international nature if any one of three factors are met: (a) the parties

111

UNCTAD 5.1, supra note 104, at 4.
Id. at 25.
113 See id.
114 As it is with any international subject matter, a plethora of sources exists that seeks to define the more
ubiquitous concept. As such, this Comment will mainly utilize the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York
Convention, due to their international recognition and prevalence in usage, as well as relevant U.S. statutes and
case laws.
115 Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. INT’L. 179, 195 (2006).
116 See BLACKABY, supra note 105, at n.11.
112
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have their places of business in different States, (b) the place of arbitration
agreed to or a substantial part of the parties’ commercial relationship or the
place to which the subject-matter of the dispute is most closely connected is
outside the State in which parties have their places of business, or (c) there has
been express agreement that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement
relates to more than one country.117 According to the New York Convention,
an award is “foreign” if the awards were made in a territory of a State other
than the state in which recognition and enforcement is sought.118
International “commercial” arbitration has also been broadly defined.119
Though the United States made a reservation under the New York Convention
to decide what activities may be considered commercial,120 the definition
should be read as broadly as possible under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, as to “provide for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce
Clause.”121 Under the Dobson approach of “affecting commerce concept,”122
117

UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 110, at art. 1(3).
New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. 1(1).
119 The distinction between what is commercial and what is not derives from the distinction created in
civil law countries between contracts which are commercial and those that are not. UNCTAD 5.1, supra note
104, at 10. Under the 1923 Geneva Protocol, matters were considered commercial if they were capable of
resolution by arbitration under the laws of the State concerned. Id. However, the Protocol did allow the
contracting State to enter into commercial reservations to decide what activities may be considered
commercial. Similarly, the contracting States under the New York Convention were allowed a similar
reservation against foreign arbitral awards. New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. I(3). The United
States has made such reservation under 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1980).
120 New York Convention, supra note 108 at art. I(3). The United States has made such reservation under
9 U.S.C. § 201 (1980) as a part of Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which codified the New York Convention.
The section reads,
118

A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract..
Id. However, no specific criteria exist as to what constitutes commercial, other than a referral to 9 U.S.C. § 2,
which states that the FAA covers “transaction[s] involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1980). Ultimately, the
Supreme Court stated in Dobson that the term should be read broadly as possible. Allied-Bruce Terminix Co.,
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
121 The Supreme Court’s broadening definition of commercial has opened up United States to be a
favorable forum for international commercial arbitration. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL, ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 67 (2006).
122 Id.
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the United States has effectively unified the definition of commercial, thereby
lowering transactional costs associated with international commercial
arbitration.123
The U.S. court’s broad interpretation here is in line with the definition of
what is commercial under the Model Law, which also provides an expansive
definition.124 The drafters of the UNCITRAL definition noted that the term
commercial “should be given a wide interpretation.”125 The model law then
lists a variety of what could be construed as commercial, such as consulting,
engineering, licensing and investment.126 Thus it can be said that the term
commercial is construed widely to include all aspects of international
business.127
2. Creating a Valid Arbitration Agreement
The next step in understanding international arbitration is to observe what
goes in to creating a valid arbitration agreement, which sets the stage for an
arbitral panel. To have a valid arbitration agreement under the New York
Convention, the agreement must be in writing,128 a defined legal relationship
must exist between the parties,129 and the subject matter must be capable of
123
124

Id.
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 110, at n.2.
The term “commercial” should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover matters arising from
all relationships of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not. Relationships of a
commercial nature include, but are not limited to, the following transactions: any trade
transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; commercial
representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering;
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint
venture and other forms of industrial or business cooperation; carriage of goods or passengers by
air, sea, rail or road.

Id.

125

Id.
Id.
127 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 14. This is a crucial part of understanding international arbitration for
the purpose of utilizing it as an alternate forum for forum non conveniens, as it will determine the scope to
which a judge may later dismiss a case to international arbitration. Should the nature of the case be outside
what the definition of commercial covers, it will prevent the case from being dismissed to arbitration.
128 New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. II (1) (requiring contracting states to recognize only
written arbitration agreements). Since 1958 however, the writing requirement has broadened in scope to
encompass modern methods of communication, such as e-mail. See Seoul Central District Court [S. Ct.],
2009Gahap103580, June 17, 2011 (S. Kor.) (holding that an e-mail exchange constitutes an agreement to
arbitrate in writing).
129 New York convention, supra note 108, at art. II.
126
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settlement by arbitration.130 Under the current model of international
arbitration, the first step to arbitration is agreeing to arbitrate.131
An agreement to arbitrate can be made both before the dispute has risen,
through an arbitration clause in a contract, or after, through a submission
agreement.132 Because submission agreements are made after the dispute has
risen, they tend to be narrower in scope and more detailed than an arbitration
clause.133 However, regardless of the type of agreement, the agreement must be
in writing to attain international recognition and enforcement under New York
Convention.134
The second element of an international arbitration agreement is a defined
legal relationship.135 A defined legal relationship in an arbitration agreement
seeks to outline the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and power over a particular case.136
However as with other requirements, this requirement is also vaguely phrased

130

See BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 93–95.
Arbitration has been described as a “creature of consent,” and “such consent should be freely,
knowingly, and competently given.” MOSES, supra note 110, at 19; see also Volt Info. Sciences v. Stanford,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989). If the consent is deemed to be the result of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, undue
influence, waiver, or a lack of capacity, the consent will be considered null and void. Moses, supra note 110, at
33.
132 Moses, supra note 110, at 31.
133 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 15. A third type of agreement to arbitrate has recently come into view.
Described as a “revolution of the classic arbitration theory,” investment arbitrations are different from regular
commercial arbitration in that they are not created through either a submission agreement or arbitration clause.
STEINGRUBER, supra 106, at 149. Investment arbitrations are formed between a host state and a foreign
investor in order to create a stable legal environment for the protection and enticement of foreign investment.
J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 10 (Loukas Mistelis ed.,
2012). The first BIT agreement was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. Bilateral treaty between
Pakistan and Germany ratified, EMBASSY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY ISLAMABAD AND
CONSULATE GENERAL IN KARACHI, http://www.pakistan.diplo.de/Vertretung/pakistan/en/07Economy/1__
ExternalEconomicPromotion/Invest__Schutz__Abk__Seite.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). Under the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID
Convention”), foreign investment arbitration has proliferated due to the establishment of the International
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). WEERAMANTRY, at 8; Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1964), 17.1 U.S.T. 1270.
134 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 16. The binding nature of the arbitration agreement, however, is not
limited to the parties alone anymore. With the increasing complexity of international arbitrations, states,
corporations, and individuals who were not parties to the arbitration in the beginning have found ways to
become parties through doctrinal methods. Id.
135 New York Convention, supra note 108, at art. II.
136 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 94.
131
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and is construed broadly.137 The requirement of a defined legal relationship is
satisfied once there is an arbitration agreement to form the basis of arbitral
proceedings.138
Similarly, in the United States, the courts generally defined the scope of a
legal relationship in an expansive manner.139 In the seminal case of Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Court broadened the scope
of arbitration agreements by allowing statutory antitrust claims to be decided
by an arbitral panel.140 Likewise in Multistar Leasing Ltd. v. Winstar Leasing
Ltd.,141 the court held that a claim of fraud in regards to contract performance
should be governed by the arbitration agreement. This heavy emphasis on
policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act142—to respect the consent of the
party to arbitrate and to interpret the agreement broadly to cover claims—
stands to emphasize the pro-arbitration policy of the United States and its open
interpretation towards defined legal relationship of the parties.

137 U.N. Secretary-General, International Commercial Arbitration: Analytical Commentary on Draft Text
of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 7 para. 4, U.N. A/CN.9/264 [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Analytical Commentary].
138 BLACKABY, supra note105, at 93. In the context of UNCITRAL rules, the term legal relationship
“should be given a wide interpretation so as to cover all non-contractual commercial cases occurring in
practice.” UNCITRAL Analytical Commentary, supra note 138. The text listed third party interference,
infringement of trademark or unfair competition as examples of non-contractual commercial cases. Id. In
Canada, this term has been interpreted widely. For example, in the Canadian case of Kaverit Steel Crane Ltd.
v. Kone Corp., Kaverit, the plaintiff, alleged that Kone, the defendant, had breached its license and distribution
agreement on a tort-related liability claim. Kone sought to stay the case, arguing that the case should be
handled by arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause, which stated that all disputes “arising out of or in
connection with this contract” must be arbitrated. The Court of Appeals of Alberta stated that the wording of
the arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass any claim that relied on the existence of the
contractual relationship even if the claim itself was tort based Kaverit Steel and Crane Ltd. v. Kone
Corporation, 1992 ABCA 7 (Can.) available at http://canlii.ca/en/ab/abca/doc/1992/1992abca7/1992abca7.pdf.
139 “[A]s a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983).
140 In Mitsubishi, plaintiff Mitsubishi contended that defendant Solar had breached its dealership contract
and Solar counterclaimed, stating Mitsubishi was in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act by purposely trying
to drive it out of the motor vehicle retail business. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Mitsubishi then
moved to have the case be heard by arbitrators in Japan as their contract mandated. Though the lower court
initially held that the Sherman Act claim was of too much importance to the public to be left in the hands of
arbitration, ultimately the Supreme Court held five to three that requesting extraterritorial application of a U.S.
antitrust claim by an arbitration court was valid under the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id.
141 Multistar Leasing v. Twinstar Leasing, No. Civ.A. 98-1330, 1998 WL 560331. (E.D. La. Aug. 28,
1998).
142 Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Const. Co., 729 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Whether the subject matter of the disagreement under arbitration can be
disputed in the court of arbitration is the third hurdle to overcome to start a
valid arbitration process.143 In the United States, as well other parts of the
world, subject matter may not be arbitrable if there is a federal statute against
the topic, or due to a public policy reason.144 As such, different topics are or
are not arbitrable depending on the region.145
Public policy is another reason why a subject matter may not be arbitrable.
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention empowered the States to deny
enforcement of arbitral awards on public policy grounds. Though what
constitutes public policy was not defined by the treaty, states have used this
reason to deny arbitral awards.146 As such, refusal of awards on public policy
ground has been rare.
At the same time, the scope of what is arbitrable has been expanding. In
Canada, liability in tort was an arbitrable matter.147 Likewise, in the United
States, topics that were previous not seen as being arbitrable are now gaining
143 Arbitrability is also the second factor a U.S. court looks at in order to see whether a case should be
compelled back to arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 473 U.S. 614, 616 (1985).
“[F]irst determining whether the parties’ agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues, and then, upon
finding it did, considering whether legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the
arbitration of those claims.” Id. at 628.
144 R.M. Perez & Assoc., Inc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1992); New York Convention, supra
note 108, at art. V(2)(A).
145 MOSES, supra note 110, at 226. Topics such as family law, criminal law, bankruptcy and validity of
patents that have impact on the public domain are usually ruled out from being arbitrable. Id. at 226. For
example, the Indian Supreme Court, in defining what is commercial, has generally held matters of
matrimonial, family, cultural, social or political nature to be non-commercial. See generally R.M. Investment
and Trading Co. v. Boeing Co. Supreme Court, India, 10 February 1994 (A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1136). For example,
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement with consumer is invalid under the European Union Directive on Unfair
Terms In Contracts. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L095). Similarly, in the supreme court of Hong
Kong held that issue of insolvency, such as petition for liquidation, was not an arbitrable matter. In Re MechPower Hong Kong-China, [1996] H.K.C.F.I 307 (C.F.I.) available at http://www.hklii.hk/eng/hk/cases/hkcfi/
1996/307.html.
146 Public policy was used as justification for rejecting the enforcement of an arbitral award by the
Turkish Supreme Court in 1995 on the basis that the arbitral court did not apply Turkish law for its substantive
law and procedural law. However this decision was heavily criticized as being a faulty application of public
policy. See JACOB GRIERSON, ANNET VAN HOOFT, ARBITRATING UNDER THE 2012 ICC RULES AN
INTRODUCTORY USER’S GUIDE 228 (Wolster Kluwer, 2012). Though authorities split on whether there is an
abuse of this theory. Compare id. (holding that the standard is vague and is most abused of all NY convention
reservation) with MOSES, supra note 110, at 228. (stating that there is a narrow scope in keeping with the
Conventions’ pro-enforcement purpose). Most countries have shown reluctance in applying public policy as a
ground for arbitral refusal. See id. at n.84.
147 Crane Ltd. v. Kone Corp., Albertra Court of appeal. Corporation, 1992 ABCA 7 (Can.), available at
http://canlii.ca/en/ab/abca/doc/1992/1992abca7/1992abca7.pdf.
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ground. For example, antitrust was not an arbitrable topic until the decision in
Mitsubishi.148 Topics that seem to indicate public interest, such as natural
resources, are increasingly becoming regarded as arbitrable.149
3. Shaping an Arbitral Court
After creating a valid arbitration agreement, the next step in arbitration is to
decide who, when, where, and what law will be applied in future disputes
under the agreement. The autonomy and flexibility accorded to the participants
in arbitration to mold and shape their own court are perhaps some of the most
enticing aspects of international commercial arbitration.
After the parties decide to arbitrate, the parties must then decide whether
they want the procedural elements of their arbitration to be governed by
themselves, ad hoc, or by others, through an arbitral institution.150 After
148 Areas of law such as employment and securities are also now routinely arbitrated in the United States.
MOSES, supra note 110, at 32. Competition law, which was in place to protect the public at large, was
originally seen as a matter of public law and thus out of the scope of arbitrators, who only resolves disputes in
respect to the immediate parties before them. Id. However the practice of competition law arbitration has
grown significantly. Francesca Richmond, Arbitrating Competition Law Disputes: A Matter Of Policy?
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 2, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/02/09/arbitratingcompetition-law-disputes-a-matter-of-policy/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014).
149 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 135.
150 MOSES, supra note 110, at 8. An arbitral institution helps to administer the arbitration by providing
assistance with selecting an arbitral tribunal and facilitating communication between the parties and the
tribunal. S.I. STRONG, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR
U.S. JUDGES (2012) AT 7. Ad hoc arbitration in contrast, has no administrative body. Id. Ad hoc arbitration is
an arbitral process that is almost entirely conducted by the parties, who could apply pre-existing rules
established by institutions such as the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law arbitration rule
(“UNCITRAL rule”). The UNCITRAL rules were created after extensive consultation with arbitral institutions
and experts. Recommendation to Assist Arbitral Institutions and other interested bodies with regard to
arbitrations under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules adopted at the fifteenth session of the commission, 1982
Y.B. Commission on Int’l. Trade Law, Volume XIII. The UNCITRAL is one of the most prominent publishers
of ad hoc rules to be used. International Arbitration, http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html. Other
institutions, such as the American Arbitration Association and the International Chamber of Commerce have
also promulgated arbitral rules to be used in ad hoc proceedings. Other notable publishers include ICC, LCIA,
Swiss Chamber of Commerce, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Center. STRONG, supra note 150, at 8. The UNCITRAL rules have not only been used by
parties in arbitral proceedings, but also by arbitral institutions creating their own model rule. UNCTAD 5.1,
supra note 104. Recommendation to Assist Arbitral Institutions and other interested bodies with regard to
arbitrations under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules adopted at the fifteenth session of the commission,
Yearbook of the U.N. commission on Int’l. Trade Law, 1982, Volume XIII. The benefit of ad hoc arbitration is
that the parties have greater opportunities in drafting their own rules and tailoring the procedure to the
particular kind of dispute. MOSES, supra note 110, at 10. Ad hoc arbitration is favorable especially when the
parties require great flexibility in the proceeding, such as when both sides have claims against one and other.
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deciding whether to conduct an ad hoc arbitration or institutional arbitration,
the parties must then decide where to place the arbitration.151 The seat plays a
tremendous role in arbitration, because it governs a number of issues such as
confidentiality, whether interim measures can be granted and the remedy the
arbitration court can order.152
The next consideration in the modern international arbitration process is
choosing who will serve as the arbitrator. Depending on the rule that the
parties have agreed upon, an arbitral tribunal can be a single person, or
multiple individuals.153 In deciding which law will govern the dispute, the
parties are free to choose from among variety of laws.154 Using a national law
has its advantage in that it provides for a known legal standard.155
Unsurprisingly, national law is the most often sought after as a choice of law
for arbitral process.156 However as long as the choice of law does not override
the mandatory rules of law of a country to which all the factual elements of the
dispute arises from, that law will be held as a valid selection.157
Id. Though the greatest disadvantage of ad hoc arbitration is that it does not have the administrative help that
an institutional arbitration has been prepared to provide, arbitral institutions have worked in conjunctions with
ad hoc arbitrations to provide administrative services. Id. Its opponents also argue that unlike institutional
arbitration, ad hoc arbitration can run into difficulties when appointing who may administer the arbitration.
However since 1976, the PCA secretary-general has received over 270 cases requesting designation.
UNCITRAL arbitration rules: report of the secretary-general of the permanent court of arbitration on its
activities under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules since 1976. A/CN.9/634. However, mechanisms such as
application of the PCA Secretary-General exist in order for parties to conduct an ad hoc arbitration that allows
both the flexibility as well as administrative support that the parties require. Id.
151 GRIERSON, supra note 146, at 114. This is a crucial question, as what is commonly referred to as “seat
of arbitration,” which determines whose national law and court may govern the arbitration procedure, known
as lex arbitri, is different from the venue of arbitration, which notes where the arbitration process will
physically take place. The seat of arbitration also determines whether the arbitral award could be enforced.
Laura Warren, The Seat of Arbitration—Why is it so Important?, CLYDE&CO (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.
clydeco.com/insight/articles/the-seat-of-arbitration-why-is-it-so-important.
152 GRIERSON, supra note 146, at 114.
153 See, e.g., INT’L CT. OF ARB., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMM., ARBITRATION RULES, art. 13 (2013). If one
were to pursue institutional arbitration, the administrating agency would decide upon the tribunal panel.
Nevertheless, even within ad hoc arbitration, parties can apply UNCITRAL rules and take advantage of the
PCA secretary general to decide for them. In an ad hoc arbitration however, it is up to the parties to decide
how many individuals will serve as a panel member and who will be the one adjudicating.
154 Choices can be from national law, public international law, concurrent laws and combined laws,
transactional law such has lex mercatoria, and equity. BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 199.
155 Id. The national law of the seat of the arbitration is also the default governing law when no specific
law was specified.
156 Id. at 200. The national law, however, is not a perfect system. For example, a state legislator may
change the law that might apply to the case, or render the performance of certain actions impossible. Id. at 201.
157 Id. at 200.
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4. Enforcement of Arbitral Award
The last step in arbitration is the enforcement of the award. Other than its
ability to create a neutral and flexible forum, the popularity of international
arbitration comes from the enforceability of the awards.158 More commonly
known as the New York Convention, The Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards was adopted by the United Nations in
1958.159 The purpose of the New York Convention was to create a set of rules
to enforce arbitration awards that met the standards of international trade.160
Currently, the New York Convention has 149 signatories with the United
States ratifying in 1970.161
Under the New York Convention, arbitral awards are upheld as long as
they do not violate the reservations made by the individual countries or its
federal statute and/or public policy.162 The two types of reservations that could
be made under the conventions are reciprocity and commercial reservation.163
States that have made the reciprocity reservation only accept arbitral awards
made in other States who have agreed to the Convention.164 The commercial
reservation allows the countries to define what “commercial” means, thereby
allowing the countries to narrow the scope of what may be enforced.165
From observing the procedural and the foundational structure of modern
international commercial arbitration, one can conclude that it is a flexible
system that can be arranged to create an individually tailored forum, able to

158

The New York Convention and the Panama convention are the two treaties that govern the upholding
international commercial arbitral awards within the United States. Strong, supra note 150, at 12.
159 New York Convention, supra note 108.
160 Econ. Soc. Council, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards,
E/Ac.42/4/Rev.1, Mar. 28, 1955 (last visited Feb. 23, 2014). [hereinafter Committee Report on NY
Convention]
161 Status Map, supra note 108.
162 New York Convention, supra note 108, art. V(a) & (b).
163 Id. at art.(I)(3). The United States has made both of these reservations. New York Convention, supra
note 108.
164 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 442.
165 Id. As discussed above, the United States has made both of these reservations. Supra note 163.
Regardless of such reservation, as articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s
London v. Argonaut Ins. Co., there lies a “very specific interest of the federal government in ensuring that its
treaty obligation to enforce arbitration agreements covered by the Convention finds reliable, consistent
interpretation in our nation’s courts.” 500 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir. 2007). As such, the pro-arbitration policy of
the United States has made upholding arbitral awards from foreign territory an efficient task.
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accommodate variety of disputes. This is especially true for the United States,
due to its respect towards party autonomy and arbitration.
C. Support For and Against Arbitration as an Alternate Forum
Though arbitration has been praised for its enforceability and flexibility,166
opponents of arbitration have suggested that arbitration tends to settle more
often167 and pointed out its limitations in complicated cases.168 This section
discusses some of concerns addressed regarding arbitration. Following, it will
discuss potential benefits to arbitration and why arbitration may be a better
alternative for plaintiffs against Multinational Corporation in international suits
over human rights council or tertiary party in investment arbitration.
1. The Argument Against Arbitration
Arbitration is by no means a perfect process. Though arbitration has been
growing in scope, there still exist topics that could never be arbitrated, such as
family law, bankruptcy and criminal law.169 As such, there will still be cases
that must be dismissed over to a national court, rather than to an arbitral panel.
There is also a question of administrative complication. As discussed
above, two types of arbitration exists, institutional or ad hoc.170 Though
institutional arbitration would provide for the necessary administrative task,
such as keeping records and selecting arbitral bodies, there may be public
policy issues behind an U.S. court endorsing a certain brand of privatized
institution to which it will export its justice.171
As such, the fairest standard would be through an ad hoc arbitration.
However, with ad hoc arbitration comes finding the necessary bodies to help
with administrative tasks. Furthermore, due to the relative lack of structure, a
significant drafting task is required of the American legal body to help tailor a
set of procedural rules that would make an arbitration court a suitable alternate
166

GRIERSON, supra note 146, at 23.
Id. at 28. Settling is viewed as negative, because arbitration is viewed as incentivizing settling more so
than hashing out the facts to achieve notions of justice.
168 Id. Compared to national litigation, arbitration has difficulties when the dispute involves more than
two parties, or the matter arises under multiple contracts. But see id. at 41–42 (discussing methods of dealing
with multi-party and multiple contract disputes under arbitration.).
169 MOSES, supra note 110, at 32.
170 Supra Part II (b)(ii).
171 Supra Part II (b)(ii), at 30 (discussing public policy).
167
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forum. As such, court involvement and administrative cost are necessary
components arbitration. Arbitration is not insulated from corruption.172 Finally,
the notion of exporting out justice out of the scope of realm of public legal
sector to private can create a sense of unease.
2. The Argument for Arbitration
Even after considering the arguments against arbitration, the benefits of
utilizing arbitration to ease the tension between forum non conveniens and
foreign judgment enforcement outweigh the perceived difficulties. Arbitration
is easy to enforce, gives a chance for plaintiffs to have their voices heard, and
removes U.S. courts from the delicate and difficult position of issuing an
opinion that may impact international relationships.
First, utilizing arbitration would address the unanswered questions left in
attempts to harmonize forum non conveniens and UFCMJRA/ FCMJRA.173
Such questions include the burden placed on the U.S. judge to account for an
ex ante foreign nation’s stability, and possible diplomatic discord that may
derive from the said analysis; and enforcing fraudulent judgments obtained
from foreign courts that were utilized as alternate forum were left
unanswered.174 Should arbitration be an option for the courts to choose as an
alternate forum, however, many of these issues could be avoided. With a
second alternate forum in case of a political vacuum, judges will no longer
have to bet all of their cards on a foreign forum in their forum non conveniens
analysis. Also, by being able to forego opting for the foreign forum without
having to explicitly state why they are staying the case in the U.S., judges will
be able to refrain from potentially causing international insult to the forum in
question. Lastly, under the section 10 of Federal Arbitration Act, arbitral
awards that were procured by corruption, fraud or undue means would not be
enforced in U.S. courts.175 As such, through arbitration, many of the
unanswered questions could be remedied.
172

For example, in the United States, an arbitrator is immune from civil liability for all acts related to his
decision making function and has a wide scope of immunity that covers intentionally fraudulent act. ICC
INT’L. ARB. CONG., INT’L COUNCIL FOR COMM. ARB. NO. 11, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS 282 (Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 2003). Also, there is the tendency
of international judges and arbitrators to avoid any confrontation with misdeeds that may arise from an arbitral
proceeding. Id. at 284.
173 See Whytock, supra note 56, at 1470.
174 Supra Part I(E).
175 Federal Arbitration Act, 9. U.S.C. 10 (2002).
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Other suggestions have been made to give plaintiffs such as those in
Aguinda v. Texaco a chance to bring suit for their damages. Methods such as
filing a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and
the Inter-U.S. court in regards to harms caused by impacts of foreign
investment have been suggested.176 Other suggestions include filing amicus
curiae as part of ICSID arbitration between the investor and the state, as a
method to give plaintiffs a voice.177 However, none of these solutions has the
ability to enforce its judgment in the courts of the U.S., let alone other parts of
the world.178 Thus, referring these cases to arbitration has the benefit ease of
enforcement once an award has been rendered.
Also, even though amicus curiae would allow the party to have their voices
heard to some degree, ICSID arbitrations are strictly between a state and its
investor; thus plaintiffs in these cases would be limited to a third party role.179
However, with an arbitration panel that was created through a submission
agreement between the two parties, the plaintiffs have a guaranteed chance of
having their cases heard and to be center-stage in the litigation. Though
arbitration is often confidential,180 and thereby deprives the plaintiff an open
day in court, it is still a worthy trade-off to being nearly guaranteed of
enforcement of any potential award later on.
Other suggestions include allowing the host states the right to arbitrate
investors for violation of domestic laws in respect of health, environmental or
social standards on the behalf of their citizens.181 However, this again forces
the plaintiff to take a backseat to their own claim. Also there is no guarantee
that the host state will bring such suit against the investor over its own interest
to encourage greater investment. Therefore, this again would not provide the
similar chance of representation as a direct arbitration between the harmed
party and the defendant.

176 Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 729, 739 (2009).
177 Id. at 740.
178 The United States neither signed nor ratified the Declaration for Recognition of The Jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm.
179 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
art. 25, ¶ 1, Aug. 27, 1965, 17.1 U.S.T. 1270.
180 GRIERSON, supra note 145, at 114.
181 Francioni, supra note 176, at 738.
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The U.S. courts benefit from having cases sent to arbitration as much as the
plaintiff does. As one can see in its recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum,182 the United States Supreme Court has been hesitant to broaden
the scope of the American treatment towards Alien Torts Claims act (ATS). In
Kiobel, the Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritorialities
to avoid having to exert its jurisdiction over an international issue.183
This show of sensitivity of the U.S. court in exercising its power over
international matters can also be found in cases such as Goss Int’l. Corp. v.
Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd.. In Goss, the Eighth Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction against a Japanese company and mentioned how
commentators defined the concept of comity by mentioning “courtesy,
politeness, convenience or goodwill between sovereigns, a moral necessity,
expediency, reciprocity or consideration of high international politics
concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between
nations.”184
Other legal doctrines such as the Act of State doctrine also show the
hesitation of U.S. courts in stepping in the territories of Article I and II.185 As
such, by referring the case to arbitration, which is apolitical, rather than forcing
the court to make a public evaluation of a foreign government in both sending
the case over and in enforcing a judgment, both the U.S. court and its
government would strongly benefit from being able to send a more uniformed,
solidified voice towards the international community.
D. International Arbitration as Adequate Alternate Forum for Forum Non
Conveniens
Part D seeks to place international arbitration in the context of forum non
conveniens as an adequate, alternate forum. Here, the comment looks to the
two biggest hurdles in utilizing arbitration in forum non conveniens context,
182
183
184

2007).

See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. __ (2013).
Id. at 13.
Goss Intern. Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 360 (8th Cir.

185 The Act of State doctrine is a judicial self-restraint from cases that deals with foreign sovereign which
results in claims being dismissed on their merits. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FRAMEWORKS 208 (3d ed. 2010). See also Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (holding that “the
courts of one country will not sit in the judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within in its
own territory.”); see generally BEDERMAN, at 165 (discussion on the role of international law and federal
statutes and executive determinations).
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consent and arbitrability. The following segment frames international
arbitration within forum non conveniens factors introduced in Part I.A to test
arbitration’s compatibility with the doctrine.
Though there are a plethora of examples of conditioned forum non
conveniens dismissals,186 such conditions are stipulated to a national court and
never to an arbitral body. However, before even getting to the question of
whether an arbitration court would satisfy the test for forum non conveniens, a
preliminary question of whether an arbitration court could even be tailored to
be such a court must be answered. The biggest procedural challenges in
answering this question arise from the issues of consent and arbitrability.
Consent to arbitrate has been described as the glue that forms the backbone
of arbitration,187 and as such the topic plays a crucial role in determining
whether arbitration can serve as an alternate forum. Here, as arbitration would
be used in forum non conveniens, one would assume that there would be no
pre-existing agreement to arbitrate. As such the parties would attain consent
through a submission agreement. However as the name implies, there must be
a form of consent for there to be a submission agreement. Combining court
order and consent can create issues. For example, under the UNCITRAL
Model Law, courts may not refer an action to arbitration sua sponte without
obtaining party consent.188 Similarly, courts within the U.S. have held that
courts do not have the authority to mandate arbitration sans agreement of the
parties.189

186

Supra Part (I)(a), at 8.
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 69 (2006).
188 UNICTRAL Analytical Commentary, supra note 137, at art. 8. On the flipside, once the parties
consent to arbitration, the court must respect that decision. GreCon Dimter v. J. R. Normand [2005] 2 S.C.R.
401, para. 46 (Can.). In the U.S. however, there has been a rise of court annexed compulsory arbitration. See
e.g., LR 16.7, N.D. Ga. (a rule exemplifying a court annexed arbitration). In the E.D.N.Y., there has even been
a formation of commercial arbitration. COMM. ON FED CT. ASS’N ON THE BAR OF CITY OF N.Y., COURTANNEXED MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF NEW YORK: THE JUDGES’
PERSPECTIVE 26, N.25. More states are following suit, see, e.g., AJS SPECIAL COMM. ON BUS. CT., PROPOSAL
FOR PILOT PROGRAM CONCERNING COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION FOR COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN THE
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF HAWAII. However, even in the case of court annexed arbitration, the awards
are not binding unless consent of both parties exist. To learn more about court annexed arbitration, see
generally Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zelden, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal Court: the
Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 4 (2012).
189 See, e.g., Dakoda Foundry v. Tromley Indus. Holdings, 737 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
first task of a court asked to compel arbitration is to see whether the parties agreed to arbitrate, and that lacking
consent, the court has no authority to mandate arbitration).
187
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However consent in international arbitration is not simply limited to
express consent of both parties.190 As the New York convention itself is silent
on binding nonsignatories to arbitral awards, courts, especially in the United
States, have been given the room to explore and to test the limit of the
convention’s plain language.191 For example, in certain countries including the
United States, consent to arbitrate can be transferred through the contractual
theory of assignment.192 This is usually justified on economic grounds, in that
arbitration is usually entered for “expediency, cost-efficiency and other
perceived advantages.”193 Case law under the interpretation of the UNCITRAL
rules have shown similar broadening of definition in regard to upholding
awards to non-signatories.194
Domestic courts within the U.S. have taken this concept of consent even
further through court-annexed arbitration.195 In court-annexed arbitration, the
parties, under the instruction of the court, are compelled to arbitrate, rather
than consenting to arbitrate.196 As such, court-annexed arbitration, the concept
of consent does not exist. Unlike private arbitration, rulings from courtannexed arbitration are non-binding and the parties are entitled to a de novo
190 The United States is also a proponent of binding nonsignatories. PEDRO J. MARTINEZ-FRAGA, THE
AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENTS AND
DISCOVERY METHODS 152–59 (2009).
191 Id. at 152.
192 These countries include France, England, Sweden, Switzerland and Germany. STEINGRUBER, supra
note 105, at 147. Other contractual theories as well as commercial legal principles such as agency, alter ego,
and estoppel apply in binding non-signatories as well. Id. at 152. In the United States, courts have applied
“five theories” of binding nonsignatories; “1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veilpiercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel.” Thompson-CSF v. Am. Arb. Ass’n., 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995).
Perhaps the most controversial theory of binding non-signatories to arbitration is the “group of companies”
doctrine. STEINGRUBER, supra note 105, at 152. Under this doctrine, regardless of the legal independence of
the individual entities, these entities are considered one and the same due to their inherent degree of control
over a contract’s conclusion, performance and subsequent termination. Id. at 153. Similarly under the third
party doctrine, an intended third party beneficiary of an arbitration agreement may also request arbitration. Id.
at 150.
193 STEINGRUBER, supra note 105, at 149.
194 UNCITRAL 2012 Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade L. at143, U.N. Sales No. E.12.V.P
195 However, the diversity of the state court system renders tracing the exact origin of court annexed
arbitration nearly impossible. Judge William P. Lynch, Problems with Court-Annexed Arbitration:
Illustrations from the New Mexico Experience, 32 N.M. L. REV. 181, 184 (2002). The system survived both
seventh and fourteenth amendment challenge in cases such as In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629, 281 Pa. 223
(1955). Similarly, in Guralnick v. Supreme Court of New Jersey 747 F. Supp. 1109 (D.C.N.J. 1990), the court
held that New Jersey’s compulsory fee arbitration system for attorney fees did not violate the lawyer’s right to
a jury trial.
196 Lynch, supra note 195, at 181 n.1.
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review,197 and most uniquely, the program is conducted under the supervision
of a court. Court-annexed arbitration in federal court was made possible
through the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (“ADR Act”).198
Currently, court mandated compulsory arbitration is widely in practice within
the U.S. even though such arbitration, unlike its international counterpart, does
not derive its power through consent of the parties. Court-annexed arbitration
has been recognized for its benefit of “speedy, less expensive and more
efficient trial system” as well as high levels of litigant satisfaction.199
Though courts have taken a broad approach in defining what can be
arbitrated,200 arbitrability of the subject matter may prevent an arbitration court
from being used as a method of adjudication. Because arbitration is a private
proceeding that, though private by definition, could still have a public impact
since it could deal with subject matters that is of national concern such as
antitrust,201 some national courts, such as French courts, have labeled certain
topics that have such an impact to be reserved for national courts.202 However
despite this presumption against arbitration in public matters, an increasing
amount of subjects that have once been considered inappropriate for
arbitration, such as antirust203 and competition law, have become arbitrable.204
Regardless, it is ultimately the national law of the state that determines the

197 “An appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court’s record but reviews the evidence and law
without deference to the trial court’s rulings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (10th ed. 2014). When a court
hears a case de novo, it decides the issues without reference to the legal conclusions or assumptions made by
the previous court to hear the case. An appeals court hearing a case de novo may refer to the trial court’s
record to determine the facts, but will rule on the evidence and matters of law without giving deference to that
court’s findings. A trial court may also hear a case de novo following the appeal of an arbitration decision.” De
Novo, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/de_novo.
198 Authorization of Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C. § 654 (1998). Under the ADR Act,
federal courts are allowed to compel parties to court-annexed arbitration when “the relief sought consists of
money damages in an amount greater than $150,000.” Id at (a)(3).
199 JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A NUTSHELL 243 (4th ed.,
2013); see also Lynch, supra note 195, at 185.
200 See Lew, supra note 115, at 189.
201 BLACKABY, supra note 105, at 123.
202 See
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2059 (Fr.). English translation available at
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1950/13681/. . ./Code_22.pdf.
203 See generally Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV. Case C-126/97, [1999] 2 All
ER (Comm) 44 (holding that arbitrators are duty bound to address issues of antitrust).
204 Mitsubishi Motors v. Solar Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that antitrust issues were
deemed arbitrable). Similarly, subject matters such as patent, trademarks and copyright have been often
referred to international arbitration even though they are topics of the public. BLACKABY, supra note 105, at
125.
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domain of arbitration.205 As such, arbitrability may prevent certain cases from
being referred to arbitration by the court or for parties to take to arbitration.
III. SATISFYING FORUM NON CONVENIENS FACTORS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
The next challenge in utilizing arbitration as an alternate forum to a
national court is whether it can satisfy the definition of alternate adequate
forum in the context of forum non conveniens. As explained above,206 defining
what constitutes an adequate forum is a malleable topic. However the general
definition can be summed up as a venue where the parties will not be
“deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly.”207 This section will look to see
whether international arbitration can satisfy the standards of forum non
conveniens. It will begin with the two stage process articulated by the court in
Texaco that determines whether an adequate alternate forum exists, and if so,
whether that forum could satisfy the private interests of the parties in
maintaining the litigation in the forum.208 After that, Section A will look into
the two methods that the comment proposes to obtain consent from the parties
to dismiss a case to arbitration. In Section B, the two methods will be applied
to the situation in Texaco to test its application.
As made evident in the above discussion of international arbitration,
arbitration tribunals are a creature of flexibility; thus, meeting the requirement
of alternate adequate forum should not be a hurdle. With the right
configuration, an arbitration panel should be able to establish a forum where
the parties would not be “deprived of any remedy or treated unfairly”209
utilizing the various procedural aspect behind arbitration, such as, seat and
venue, arbitrators, choice of law, and enforcement of arbitral awards, as
mentioned in Part II. As such, with the right formation, arbitration can meet the
complicated standards of intrinsic and extrinsic factors of what may constitute
an alternate forum.210
205

Id. at 124.
Supra Part I.A.
207 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254–55 (1981).
208 Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476 (2002) (internal citation omitted).
209 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254–55 (1981).
210 Supra Part I.A. Intrinsic and extrinsic factors such as “the area of law that is the subject of the case, the
basis of subject matter jurisdiction, . . . [and] the industry of the plaintiff or defendant . . . can predict whether a
foreign forum will be considered adequate. . . . [F]actors extrinsic to the case such as the political and
governmental situation in the foreign country, a country’s economic development, the legal system in the
206
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The questions of securing an arbitration panel that would not deprive the
parties of an impartial ruling largely depend on the selection of the arbitrators.
By having the arbitration panel selected with the help of the U.S. court that is
granting the forum non conveniens, or by the PCA secretary-general (as one
would with the application of UNCITRAL rules), neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant would have to worry about being denied justice or fairness.211 To
encourage impartiality of the arbitrators, arbitral institution rules have specific
code of conduct rules for arbitrators.212 In countries that adopted the
UNCITRAL model law, arbitrators may be bound to remain fair and impartial,
to act with due care, to treat parties equally, and to give full opportunity to be
heard.213 Also, under both ad hoc and institutional arbitration, parties have the
right to challenge the arbitrator to have him moved for failing to stay
impartial.214 Likewise, under the New York Convention, depriving parties’
opportunities to be heard can be a ground to deny enforcement of arbitral
awards.215 As such, a neutral arbitrator selected by a PCA secretary-general has
much more incentive to stay impartial to the issue at hand than a national
court.216
Similarly, the intrinsic and extrinsic factors of determining whether an
alternate forum exists can easily be satisfied with the right arbitral
configuration. The intrinsic factor in forum non conveniens looks at whether
the alternate court has the subject matter jurisdiction and the degree of party
influence which may be present in that forum.217 Again, with arbitration, it is
up to the parties to determine who will decide the dispute and to select who
shall serve as an arbitrator. As such, as explained above, the court or bodies

alternate forum, and the language in the alternate forum are also considered.” Lii, supra note 15, at 514
(alternation in original).
211 Under the FAA, U.S. courts have already been delegated the power to select arbitrators when no
agreement method is provided. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1947).
212 See e.g. The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, Am. Arb. Ass’n. (2004) available
at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_003867. Similarly, the International Bar
Association appointed working group to create the IBA guidelines on conflicts of interest in International
Arbitration to develop a useful standard to help arbitrators maintain impartiality. Otto L.O. de Witt Wijnen et
al, Background Information on the IBA Guidance on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 6 BUS.
L. INT’L 433, 444 (2004).
213 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/33, supra note 110, arts. 12, 13, 14.
214 Id. arts. 12,13.
215 New York Convention, supra note 108, at 2520.
216 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 109, art. 6; see also Designation of PCA Secretary-General
as Appointing Authority, PERM. CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1063.
217 Lii, supra note 15, at 513.

LEE GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

11/18/2014 1:17 PM

HARMONIZING FORUM NON CONVENIENS

489

such as the PCA secretary-general could appoint a board of arbitrators who
will have the expertise and the neutrality to satisfy the intrinsic factors. Subject
matter jurisdiction would not be a question as the arbitral court would have
been created specifically for the matter at hand.218 Also, the question of degree
of influence the parties will have on the forum would not be an issue as long as
a neutral arbitrator could be chosen.
The extrinsic factors in forum non conveniens look to see whether the
foreign court has the necessary governmental and legal stability to provide a
fair forum.219 Here is the greatest strength of having an arbitral panel. An
arbitral panel is not a country but is an assembly of independent experts. To
even further liberate the process from outside influence, the court could
mandate the arbitration to be an ad hoc procedure, so that no third party
institution will be involved. As such, with the right infrastructure in place, an
arbitration court can easily satisfy the alternate forum requirement even better
with greater impartiality and expertise than most national courts could.
Similarly, private factors of forum non conveniens can be satisfied through
designating an arbitration court as an alternate forum. The private factors
include “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of
a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.”220 As stated above, the most
attractive side of arbitration is the parties’ degree of control to shape the
arbitration court. Here, those positive aspects of arbitration can be used to
create a court that can meet the private factors.
For example, the court deciding on the forum non conveniens motion could
require that the parties tailor the agreement in such way that the seat of the
arbitration be the United States.221 This way the procedural law that would
govern the arbitration itself would be under American jurisdiction.222 Likewise,
the court could require the arbitration’s substantive law to be the laws of the
218 For example, the PCA secretary-general would often select an arbitrator whose nationality would
differ from both parties. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 109, art. 6, para. 7.
219 Lii, supra note 15, at 514.
220 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
221 Should the parties fail to do so, the court could deny the forum non conveniens motion and stay the
case in the United States.
222 See supra note 151 for a discussion regarding seat of arbitration.
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United States as well.223 In contrast, the venue of the arbitration itself could be
wherever the most convenient location for the trial is for ease of collecting
evidence and witnesses.224 As an added procedure, the court could even require
that the American federal rules of evidence be adopted so that the plaintiffs
may enjoy the benefit of having the power of the American discovery
process.225 Also, given arbitration’s known reputation of efficiency and low
cost, it strongly correlates with the private factors endorsed by a forum non
conveniens dismissal.226
Because international arbitration has the flexibility of being able to choose
the location, the law that governs the arbitral court as well as its substantive
issue, and the process in which the arbitrators are chosen, arbitration can be
tailored to meet the requirements of forum non conveniens.
A. Obtaining Consent to Arbitrate in the Context of Forum Non conveniens
Though arbitration courts are sufficient to meet the threshold for a forum
non conveniens, major hurdles, such as obtaining consent, exist. As discussed
above, a court cannot compel arbitration in the standard definition of
international arbitration.227 As such, legal creativity is required in directing
forum non conveniens cases to arbitration. This suggests two potential methods
to remedy this situation: one through a judicial approach in which courts will
apply a new presumption as well as allowing parties to raise motions to
arbitrate, and the second through a legislative change that would allow courts
to expand upon the current notion of court annexed arbitration to include cases
that would commonly be referred out for forum non conveniens. Subsection i
discusses obtaining consent through a judicial mechanism in today’s statutory
scheme. Subsection ii takes an alternative approach of suggesting a legislative
change in the Alternate Dispute Resolution Act and Federal Arbitration Act to
expand upon court-annexed arbitration to the domains of international
223

See supra Part III.A.b.iii for a discussion on laws governing arbitration disputes.
See supra Part III.A.b.iii for a discussion regarding venue of arbitration.
225 See supra Part III.A.b.iii for a discussion on laws governing arbitration disputes. Though there has
been criticism that the American discovery rule could, in fact, slow down the arbitration process and add in
unnecessary detail. See generally Lionel M. Schooler, Using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Employment Arbitrations: The Law of Unintended Consequences?, ADR LAB. & EMP. L. COMM. (Sept. 2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/groups/labor_law/adr_newsletter/1109_issue/1109_schooler.html (last
visited Feb. 23, 2014).
226 See GRIERSON, supra note 146, at 28.
227 Committee Report on NY Convention, supra note 160, paras. 12–14.
224
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commercial arbitration. Later, section C will apply these two suggestions to
Aguinda v. Texaco to test its feasibility.
1. Obtaining Consent through Judicial Mechanism
The biggest hurdle in utilizing arbitration in the context of a forum non
conveniens motion is in obtaining the consent of the parties. However, this
issue of consent can be overcome through various creative approaches to
induce the parties to agree to arbitrate, depending on whether the motion was
raised by the defendant, or sua sponte.
Forum non conveniens can be raised either by a motion or sua sponte.
Should forum non conveniens be raised by the defendants, the court could
notify the non-moving party that their case would be dismissed under forum
non conveniens. Then the court would give an opportunity for that party to
notify the court and the moving party of their consent to arbitrate.228 Once such
consent has been obtained, the court can then grant a conditional dismissal of
the forum non conveniens by stipulating that the moving part must also agree
to arbitrate.229 Should the other side fail to do so, the court would deny the
motion and proceed with the case.
Here, both the parties, as well as the court itself, benefit by consenting to
arbitrate, rather than to keep the status quo and dismiss to a foreign court. The
plaintiff benefits from initiating the willingness to arbitrate because they will
not have to litigate in the foreign court. Though one would suppose that they
would prefer the forum of their choice, should this not be possible, arbitration
at least allows the flexibility to create an alternate forum that mimics the U.S.
legal system as closely as possible. Most importantly, should the plaintiff
succeed in the arbitration claim, not only would they be able to enforce their
judgment in the U.S., they could enforce their judgment within the scope of all
149 signatories of the New York Convention, thereby practically guaranteeing
satisfaction of their awards.230
The defendant also gains from consenting to arbitration because otherwise,
their forum non conveniens would be dismissed and they will have to litigate
228 For the non-moving party, arbitration undoubtedly is the better alternative choice, as it could be the
closest thing the non-moving party will have to the American legal system, as well as the ease of enforcement
in the United States.
229 See supra Part I.A discussion regarding precedents for conditioned forum non conveniens dismissal.
230 Status Map, supra note 108.
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in the U.S. judicial system. By having to litigate in the U.S., not only do the
defendants risk higher litigation cost, they may risk higher verdict from a
sympathetic jury trial. Furthermore, by keeping the case in U.S. court, the case
will be open to the public, and as such, the defendants may suffer negative
publicity and may suffer greater financial harm. As arbitration is a confidential
process, a corporate defendant would not have to worry about such a thing.
Likewise the court here as well benefits from dismissing the case to
arbitration. First, the court would not have to spend its judicial resources on
figuring out whether, not only its court, but the foreign government is stable
enough to conduct such a trial. Second, the court would not have been to put in
a precarious position of potentially having to make a statement regarding
another country’s government that may harm America’s international
relationships. Third, with the help of already established process in which
arbitral awards are held in place, the court has significantly less work to do
should the plaintiff later decide to claim their award in the United States.
Again, here the court can avoid taking the risk of potentially offending another
nation by refusing to acknowledge the force of its judicial system.
Should the dismissal arise sua sponte, the court would be at odds with
either dismissing the case to a foreign national court or to an arbitration panel.
The first step would be for the court to decide that arbitration would be a better
alternate forum than a foreign national court. Here, as stated above, reasons
such as judicial efficiency and preservation of the court’s domestic scope gives
the court great incentives to send the case to arbitration. Once the court
determines that it wishes to dismiss to arbitration, it admittedly has a more
difficult task in enticing the parties to arbitrate. Here, the court is in the
position of having to convince the defendant to consent to arbitration without
the benefit of threatening domestic litigation, as it is the court that is moving
for the dismissal.231

231 The defendant may benefit from being moved to a court system where enforceability back to the
American legal system under foreign judgment enforcement standard would be difficult. However it could also
be the case that the defendants themselves might not want the case to be removed, in which case obtaining
consent to arbitrate would be much easier as it will be the closest to an American legal system the party can get
to—with the right tailoring.
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As such, much of the legal creativity falls within the plaintiff’s obligation
to convince the court and to compel arbitration on the defendant.232 The
plaintiff could achieve this by trying to see whether the defendant may have
made any agreements to arbitrate with a third party/state in the commercial
activity that has led to the harm of the plaintiff in the course of its activity.
Once such agreement has been found, the plaintiff can then implicate one of
many ways in which courts have upheld binding non-signatories to arbitrate.233
The court here could then apply a legal presumption for arbitration, similar to
the presumption against extraterritorialities.234 That way, more cases could
move to arbitration while staying within the scope of the New York
Convention.
To make sure that the arbitration panel would satisfy the adequate forum
requirement of forum non conveniens as well as the New York convention, the
court could monitor the initial tailoring of the arbitration agreement and its
choice of substantive and procedural law. By assuring that the arbitration court
would meet these baseline requirements, the U.S. court benefits from satisfying
the alternate forum requirement of forum non conveniens as well as saving
greater administrative cost down the road when the parties may seek judgment
enforcement back in the United States.
2. Altering the Statutory Scheme of ADR Act and the FAA
Perhaps the swiftest and easiest way around the consent issue would be to
enact a legislative change in the Alternate Dispute Resolution Act. Under the
Alternate Dispute Resolution Act, congress could expand the scope of federal
compulsory alternate dispute resolution to allow courts to compel international
parties to arbitration sua sponte should it determine that forum non coveniens
applies. To ease the enforcement process of arbitral awards that derives out of
forum non conveniens dismissal to arbitration, congress could also alter the
Federal Arbitration Act so that international arbitration that originates from
American compulsory arbitration would be enforceable.
232 Obtaining the plaintiff’s willingness to arbitrate would not be difficult because it is in the plaintiff’s
interest to go to arbitration rather than risking re-litigating in a foreign court where the potential award may not
be enforceable in the American judicial system.
233 For non-signatories, see discussion supra note 192.
234 The presumption against extraterritorialities holds that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991)).
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As mentioned briefly above, compulsory arbitration in the United States is
not a foreign concept.235 Circuits have gone as far as to adopt forms of courtannexed commercial arbitration, thereby allowing the scope of these
arbitrations to be greater than simpler matters enlisted under the Alternate
Dispute Resolution Act.236 The biggest issue with this approach is that court
compelled arbitration is in direct conflict with the explicit intent of New York
Convention to prevent such judicial activism.237 An analytical commentary
made by the UNCITRAL regarding its Model Law explicitly notes that “the
court would refer the parties to arbitration . . . only upon request by a party
and, thus, not on its own motion.”238 As such, although enforcement within the
United States may be allowed, enforcement of awards outside of the United
States and within the 149 signatory states may be a hurdle.239 However, since a
case that is brought in the United States indicates that the plaintiff’s main
choice of forum is the United States, the plaintiff’s intent of receiving an
American award would not be affected by such legislation.
By enacting such legislation, the courts and the parties to the suit benefit
significantly as they will not have to coax consent out of one another through
frivolous motions, thereby wasting time and money. As an administrative
matter, since all districts currently have a local rule set in place to handle court
annexed arbitration, broadening the scope would take few judicial resources,
especially if a model law could be promulgated for unified effort.240 The
United States government would also benefit significantly by being able to
segregate the judicial branch from international affairs through giving the
courts an alternative to having to answer whether a foreign jurisdiction is
deemed “adequate” to the American eye. Thus, though this legislative
approach may raise difficulty due to its direct contrast with the New York
Convention,241 if the plaintiff’s goal was ultimately being able to enforce a
235

See supra Part II.D in regard to the discussion on court-annexed arbitration.
See discussion supra note 191.
237 See Committee Report on NY Convention, supra note 160, ¶12–14.
238 UNCITRAL Analytical Commentary, supra note 138, at 24.
239 Status Map, supra note 108.
240 See e.g. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, U.S. DIST. CT. E.D.N.Y 2, available at https://www.nyed.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/forms/DisputeResolutionProcedures.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); see also
supra Part II.D.i and its footnotes for discussion on court-annexed arbitration.
241 However this isn’t the first time that United States courts have ignored the implication of its action in
regards to the New York Convention. See MARTINEZ-FRAGA, supra note 190, at 156 (citing Thomson-CSF,
S.A. v. American Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that nonsignatories could be bound to
arbitration, noting the omission within in discussing the influence of the court’s decision on the New York
Convention)).
236
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judgment in the United States, this approach may fare better than the judicial
approach.
B. Revisiting the Amazon under Arbitration
The first step of revisiting Aguinda v. Texaco would require determining
whether the dispute in question could meet the commercial and arbitrability
threshold of international commercial arbitration. As reviewed above, what
sort of activity is constituted commercial is a broad term.242 Therefore, as
much of the trouble that arose for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs in the Texaco case
came from an adverse effect of investment made by Texaco in 1993 in its
original consortium agreement for oil with Ecuador, an argument could be
made that this was indeed a result of a commercial activity. More importantly,
the type of dispute here, which in its core is an environmental damage related
tort, is not something that is barred by arbitrability.243 Thus, the issues behind
Texaco should be arbitrable under the scope of international commercial
arbitration in the scope of the UNCITRAL model law and the New York
Convention. Here, this comment will apply the judicial mechanism to obtain
consent mentioned in Part II, section A to the forum non conveniens motion
filed by Texaco in 1993. It will then apply the legislative path to alter the ADR
act and the FAA suggested in Part II, section B to the same scenario to see
whether an alternate outcome could have been achieved.
1. Judicial Approach
Here, it was Texaco that first moved for forum non conveniens in 1993.244
Under the judicial approach, this would have led the court to give a chance for
the plaintiffs to either fight the forum non conveniens motion or to file a
submission agreement to arbitrate under an ad hoc system with substantive and
procedural rules that closely mimic the American rule of law. Once such
submission agreement has been filed, the court would have then conditioned
the forum non dismissal on the grounds that Texaco had agreed to move the
matter to arbitration. Should Texaco refuse the condition, the court could stay
the case in the United States. If Texaco agreed, the court would then assist the
crafting of the arbitration agreement. Such activities may include making sure
that while the seat of the arbitration would be the United States, to have
242
243
244

See supra Part II.B.i. for a discussion on the definition of “commercial.”
See supra text accompanying note 147 for discussion of abitrability.
Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 474 (2002).
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American procedural law would govern the arbitration, and setting the venue
of the arbitration to be in Ecuador so that the arbitration would indeed provide
the most convenient forum for evidence and witnesses. It could even help
select impartial and experienced arbitrators so that the dispute could be
efficiently governed, or have the parties refer to the PCA secretary-general for
referrals.245 Once the arbitral panel has been set up and an award has been
given, the winning party could move to enforce the award in the United States,
or within any jurisdiction of the signatories of New York Convention. 246
2. Legislative Approach
Under the legislative approach, once Texaco has moved for forum non
conveniens, the court would impose the case to be moved to court-annexed
arbitration under the local rules of the Southern District of New York.247 The
court could move the venue of arbitration to be in Ecuador for ease of access to
evidences and witnesses.248 As it is the nature of court-annexed arbitration, the
order would be non-binding and thus would be allowed for a de novo review
by the court should either party challenge the arbitrator’s result.249 After
surviving such appeals, either party could move to enforce the awards in the
United States as long as it meets the scrutiny of the foreign judgment
enforcement standard.250 However, unlike the judicial approach, there would
be significant difficulty should the parties attempt to enforce the award using
the power of the New York Convention in countries other than the United
States.251
Though there is no way to predict the future, either route to bring the
Texaco case towards arbitration would have solved the difficulty the case has
encountered since leaving American soil. Had Texaco refused to submit to
245

See introductory section supra Part III. for a general discussion of the PCA secretary-general.
However there is always the speculation that had Chevron failed to consent, the court may have moved
for a forum non conveniens motion sua sponte. In such case, the case risks the chance that the court may still
deem Ecuador to be an adequate, alternate forum and decide not to send the case to arbitration. Should that be
the outcome, even under this hypothetical, the case would have not been able to escape its current
predicament.
247 U.S. DIST. CT. RULES S. & E.D.N.Y., LOCAL CIV. RULE 83.9, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(2014), available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/docs/mediation/Local%20Civil%20Rule%2083.FINAL.
pdf.
248 See supra Part III.A.b.iii. for a discussion regarding venue of arbitration.
249 See supra Part II.D. for a discussion in regards to discussion on court-annexed arbitration.
250 See supra Part I.B. for a discussion on UFMJRA and FCMJRA.
251 See generally Committee Report on NY Convention, supra note 160.
246
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arbitration, the case could have simply continued in the United States and there
could have been a legitimate end to the case by now. Had the case gone to an
arbitration panel, there too would have been a high likelihood of ending the
case. Additionally, should there have been an award, that award would have
likely been upheld by the United States court, unlike the Ecuadorian judgment
that multiple countries have refused to enforce. Thus, by seeking to alter the
forum non conveniens standard by intertwining the process with commercial
arbitration, the tension between forum non conveniens and judgment
enforcement could be overcome without having to demand the courts the
ability to look into the future with 100% precision.
CONCLUSION
As of this writing, the fight between Chevron and the Texaco plaintiffs has
not ended.252 However, since its genesis in 1993, the case has led to claims of
fraud and deception, a RICO suit, as well as an investment arbitration dispute
between Ecuador and Chevron, leaving many toiled hours of thousands of
lawyers expended in the name of the case and millions spent in legal fees.253
However, one thing is certain: a judgment that was placed to address harm that
was done to the Ecuadorian people has still not been addressed in any forum,
including the United States. A new way of dealing with the apparent conflict
between forum non conveniens and foreign judgment enforcement standard
must come to light.
By availing international arbitration as an adequate forum that United
States courts can utilize in forum non conveniens dismissal, plaintiffs such as
those from Aguinda will have a chance to attain a judgment that will be
respected. Though the greatest drawback to the proposed method is that
without cooperation from the court, cases will follow the current status-quo
and be sent to a foreign national court. However, great incentives lie for
judicial cooperation. Not only does utilizing arbitration in the context of forum
non conveniens encourage judicial efficiency, judges will be able to remain
within the scope of Article III by being able to refrain from publically judging

252 Though the Ecuadorian courts have lowered the damage to $9 billion, Chevron has not paid the
judgment. Mercedes Alvaro & Daniel Gilbert, Ecuador Court Affirms and Halves Chevron Judgment, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 12 2013 11:39 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303460004579194
773203870810.
253 See supra Part I.D. for a discussion on legal expenses.
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the validity of foreign courts. Though the method is by no means perfect,254 by
taking the first step forward, this Comment hopes to bring to the light the fact
that the legal community needs to evolve to keep up in a globalized world and
provide a valid forum for international plaintiffs.
JUNGMOO LEE∗

254 For example, though conditioned dismissal of forum non conveniens does have its precedent, parties
could bring the due process challenge of having to go to private adjudication. Likewise, the statutory change
could be too drastic and could lead to failure to comply by the standards of New York Convention.
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